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CHAPTER I  
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Management of supply chains facing atypical demand settings is challenging. 
Demand during events such as promotional sale, seasonal sale and or short life 
cycle product introduction is notoriously uncertain and therefore very difficult to 
predict. Demands arising from such events are called atypical demand. However, 
these events bring huge financial opportunity to the supply chain players.  
In industries such as fashion, toys, and high-tech electronics, time-to-
market and product turnover are vital; product has very short life and is sold in 
brief and well-defined selling seasons (Christopher 2004, Johnson 2001). 
Demand faced by such industries are extremely volatile and seasonal in nature, 
and highly unpredictable (Wong et al 2005). In addition, with a lot of this 
manufacturing being outsourced to distant countries, transit times are longer, 
creating additional constraints. The end result being higher costs of obsolete 
inventory, lost sales and markdowns. Early on, Reinmuth and Geurts (1972) 
labeled similar settings combined with promotions atypical. We particularly define 
atypical demand settings to be those settings where construction of a predictive 
time-series model for demand forecasting is difficult, consistent with observations 
by Hausman (1969). 
Effective ways of managing atypical demand situation are: (a) Modeling 
the uncertainty, (b) improve visibility and, (c) decision making based on predictive 
updates.  Modeling the uncertainty would need establishing methods and 
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practices to monitor different source of market events and explore relationship 
between factors that can generate a demand estimate. Revised estimates based 
on recent market information should in turn be used to revise operational 
decisions. Market events are typically more visible to players closer to the final 
customer. Demand predictions or transformation of such information (e.g. soft 
orders), should be shared by downstream player through collaborative planning 
or information sharing framework with key supply chain partners. This improves 
downstream visibility for upstream players and enables them to efficiently 
position their resources and plan activities to hedge against uncertainty. In 
addition to downstream information, upstream information from supplier to buyer 
could potentially increase the supply side visibility. Increased supply side visibility 
helps reduce supply uncertainty and enables buyer to take action in case of 
possible supply shortage or supply disruption. Research done by AMR Research 
found that, ability to share information faster and more accurately among players 
allows them to see trends sooner and it is the real value of supply chain enablers 
(Koch 2004). Particularly in atypical demand situations, early planning through 
better visibility can make a huge difference; for example, a supplier that plan 
early and initiate necessary activities will benefit from better utilization of his 
resources and facilities where last minute ramp ups are usually very expensive. 
Similarly, a vendor gets a better assessment of supply uncertainty if supplier is 
updated with the order inventory position; for example, in case of possible supply 
shortage, she can go for an alternative supplier (such as a subcontractor) and or 
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plan for a substitute product to hedge the possibility of lost-revenue due to lost 
sales. 
However, the challenge is, to reap the benefit from superior predictive 
methods, forecasting updating technique, immediate information sharing and 
early warning about possible revenue opportunity, players will need custom 
operations planning policies in place that are sophisticated enough to incorporate 
extra information that are more frequently updated and finally generate 
recommendations that allows them to make intelligent decisions. This combined 
set: more predictive power, framework for sharing information and tools/policies 
to help make operational decisions can position the supply chains facing atypical 
demand in a competitive advantage against their competitors. 
A supply chain player facing atypical demand, before beginning any 
initiatives in terms of investment for a information sharing system or bringing 
innovation in their operational policies need to investigate the return on 
investment and effort that it plan to put for change. Some of the key questions 
they face while performing this step are: what benefit sheared-information brings 
to the company or the supply chain as a whole, will it reduce cost, what are the 
options, which information to share, what operational changes are necessary, do 
we even have data to explore all these questions objectively etc. In this 
dissertation, we try to explore some of these important questions in the context of 
atypical demand situations. In this chapter, we characterize atypical demand, 
present a short literature about impact of atypical demand, more specifically, 
seasonal and promotional sales in industry and then explore questions based on 
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industry need and driven by gaps in literature. We have identified information that 
can be shared between players, we have detailed discussion on the benefit of 
sharing them and presented operational policies and analysis that work with 
those information. 
 
1.2 Characterizing atypical demand 
 ‘Atypical demand’ situation has the following characteristics: 
(i) A type of demand situation with high uncertainty and, forecasting through time 
series model does not result in good predictions. In such situations, demand 
is modeled through distributions or histograms based on experts’ opinion or 
past data and forecast are updated as new market information becomes 
available. 
(ii) Example of atypical demands are demand for a short life cycle product or a 
seasonal item under promotion that depends on numerous complex market 
activities such as weather, demand of substitute product, competitor’s 
behavior, market price, overall economy etc.  
(iii) Demand is usually intense in a short period due to its seasonal nature, 
promotional push and/or because product life cycle is relatively short. 
Demand could be so volatile that sales may jump to several times higher than 
any typical sales day. 
(iv) Usually supply chain players near to the final customer face such demand. 
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The assumption that construction of a time series model (stationary or 
non-stationary) for predictive purpose is difficult in atypical situation has been 
researched by Hausman (1969). He provides evidence of such demand 
scenarios. 
  Reinmuth and Geurts (1972) also studied a similar demand situation. They 
are the first to discuss ‘atypical situation’. We use the phrase ‘atypical demand’ 
for the purpose of brevity, and depict demand characteristics outlined above.  
 
1.3 Example of atypical demand: seasonal and promotional sales 
One example of atypical demand situation is seasonal and promotional sales. 
Here we present a literature review of the significance of such demand situations. 
A recent survey that explored the format of customer shopping and spending 
across retail chains found that that on an average a grocery store sells 18.2% on 
promotion, a mass merchandiser sells 13.9% on promotion, and a drug store 
sells 24.3% sells on promotion (Fox 2004). According to the National Christmas 
Tree Association (NCTA 2000a), about 28 million natural Christmas trees were 
purchased for the holiday in 2001, nearly $1 billion in retail sales. Ann Taylor, a 
U.S. women’s apparel retailer with over 580 stores nationwide, reported a year 
on year increase in sales by 26% over the Christmas period of 2003 (Liu and 
Ryzin 2005). Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, reports that, holiday season 
sales - including Thanksgiving and post-Christmas season sales events - 
account for close to 20% of total annual sales (Rozhon 2005). Retailers have 
recognized the potential of pricing and promotion as tools to boost seasonal 
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sales. A study by Fearne et al (1999) done in UK on alternative promotion 
strategies in spirit category, found that impact of tactical promotions to increase 
share and volume growth in this sector is significant and essential even during 
the Christmas period. Larson (2004) states that retailers and producers can 
boost sales of Christmas trees by application of promotion and price tactics. If 
natural Christmas tree growers and seller do not use promotion as a sales 
leverage assuming it’s a seasonal item, then plastic trees may eat away their 
market share; in 2001, only 24% house hold has natural trees and 52% has 
artificial trees (NCTA 2002b). 
 
1.4 Atypical demand and supply chain management 
Objective of a retailer during promotional and seasonal sales is to generate store 
traffic and help communicate image (Blattberg et al 1990), to increase revenue 
and profit in the short-term as well the long-term. Seasonal and promotional 
sales events however generate largest swings in demand, and as a result, they 
face the majority of out-of-stock, excess inventory, and unplanned logistics costs 
(VICS 2004). The ill effects of such events propagate beyond the boundary of the 
retailer’s business. These events are one of the root causes of bullwhip effect 
(Lee et al 1997). Supply chain inefficiencies caused by bullwhip are: excessive 
inventory investment, poor customer service, lost revenue, misguided capacity 
plans, ineffective transportation, and missed production schedule (Lee et al 
1997). Every day low price (EDLP) is prescribed as a counter measure for high-
low pricing (HLP) to alleviate the detrimental effect of bullwhip (Lee et al 1997). 
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While such a prescription can dampen the bullwhip effect, not every retailer is 
embracing it. Based on a survey conducted among 86 grocery stores for 26 
product categories, Hoch et al (1994) finds that an EDLP policy reduced profit by 
18%, and HLP increased profit by 15%. A recent article by Lee (2004a) states 
“by applying tools such as pricing and promotions companies can influence 
demand and better manage their partnerships”.  
These researches imply that the promotional and seasonal sales deserve 
more attention, because they come with huge financial opportunity but with 
notorious uncertainty. Strategies like price promotion at the front-end of the 
supply chain with improved logistics on the back-end can be a defensible 
competitive advantage (Hoch et al 1994). Given that the repercussions of these 
front-end supply chain events go beyond retailer’s business, some of the 
effective ways to reap the benefits while taking care of the uncertainty are 
increased collaboration and information sharing between retailers and suppliers 
Buy item at 
Another Store 32%
Substitute-  
Same Brand 20%
Daily Purchase 
17% 
Substitute- Different 
Brand 32% 
Do Not Purchase 
Item 11% 
Manufacturer loses 
(48%) 
Retail loses 
(59%) 
Figure 1.1 Consumer response to out-of-stock event. Source: GMA/FMI retail 
out-of-stock study (Gruen et al. 2002) 
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of seasonal products, superior forecasting with forecast update techniques, and 
replenishment and inventory/manufacturing policies specifically designed to cope 
with such events. Seasonal and promotional events hold opportunities for both 
front-end seller as well as manufacturers of seasonal items. On the other hand, 
out-of-stock are also more common during such events, just as the customer 
demand peaks. Both the manufacturer as well as the retailer lose out during 
these out-of-stock conditions. For example, according to a recent retail out-of-
stock study (Gruen et al. 2002), as illustrated in figure 1.1, retailers are likely to 
lose more than one-half of the intended purchases when a consumer confronts 
an out-of-stock, and manufacturers lose about one-half of the intended 
purchases. Pushing more inventories into the supply chain as a remedy to the 
stock-out problem however is not the solution (VICS 2004). Obsolete inventory 
management in case of overstock through clearance pricing is a major challenge 
for retail chains (Smith and Achabal 1998). For products like greeting cards, that 
has a finite selling season and uncertain demand, end of the season clearance 
pricing may not even work. 
 
1.5 Supply chain setting for this research 
This dissertation concentrates on a two-player supply chain facing a seasonal 
and/or a promotional sale. Among the two-players is a buyer 
(retailer/distributor/vendor) that makes ordering decision(s) in the presence of 
upstream supply uncertainty and demand forecast revision(s).
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Figure 1.2:  Supply chain configuration with a buyer and a supplier, along with theirs operating policies and 
uncertainties they face. Arrows represent direction of information, product, and fund flows. 
Buyer Supplier 
Replenishment
? Soft-order(s) 
? Final order 
? DP based 
Downstream information: 
Soft-order(s) 
Product 
? Short life cycle 
? Seasonal product 
Upstream information: 
Order inventory position 
Funds 
? Deposit 
? Return Supply ? Constrained
? Uncertain 
Production 
? Release 
? DP based 
Demand 
? Soft-orders
? Final order 
 
Capacity 
? Contained 
? Random yield 
Demand 
? Atypical 
  (Seasonal &/or
   Promotional) 
Overage Cost + Underage Cost + Holding Cost Overage Cost + Underage Cost + Deposit Cost
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Second player is a manufacturer that supplies the buyer; demand for this supplier 
is buyer’s replenishment orders. Figure 1.2 illustrates the supply chain 
configuration with uncertainties that the players face and the decisions they need 
to make. Direction of arrows represent product, information and fund flows. 
 
1.5.1 Characterization of a buyer facing atypical demand 
(i) Buyer faces an atypical demand setting and must receive the only 
order shipment from the supplier before the start of the sale. 
(ii) Buyer knows the date of the sale and plans for the sale quite early in 
time. 
(iii) Buyer incurs no holding cost for the order is received just before the 
sale starts. She faces an underage cost for every unit short and an 
overage cost for every unit of excess at the end of the sales event. 
(iv) Buyer carries no substitute product for the product on sale and 
replenishment decisions need to be made for one product. 
(v) Demand forecasts are generated based on early market information 
and revised subsequently as time approaches the sale. Buyer has 
some prior knowledge of the demand uncertainty either in the form of 
past demand data or expert knowledgebase. 
(vi) Supplier’s delivery quantity never exceeds the size of the final order. 
From past knowledge, buyer knows the degree of supply uncertainty. 
Replenishment decisions are made considering both demand and 
supply uncertainty. 
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1.5.3 Characterization of a supplier that replenishes the above buyer 
(i) Manufacturer of the seasonal product. 
(ii) Does not build inventory unless he is notified about a possible 
purchase by buyer or he is sent a final purchase order. 
(iii) His capacity is constrained and faces random yield. Capacity is 
considered inflexible and last minute ramp-up to satisfy an order is not 
a possibility. 
(iv) Supplier lacks independent forecasting capability for market demand 
and relies on retailer’s orders and soft-order revisions.  
(v) Supplier has history of past orders and soft-order revisions from the 
same customer for the same or related product, and uses it for making 
production release decisions. 
1.6 Supply chain planning and information sharing 
This dissertation concentrates on a decision model with a time-frame which is 
within the time between the buyer sending a signal about a planned sale to the 
time the actual demand is observed by the retailer. This period is typically from a 
quarter and a year. Based on Chopra and Meindl (2004), we may classify this 
research to fall under the category of supply chain planning. As illustrated in 
figure 2, the flow of information, products, and funds between these two players 
occur in both directions. The information we consider in this research is as 
follows: 
(i) Soft-order(s): Based on early forecast of atypical demand, buyer 
generates a soft-order and sends it to the supplier. In doing so, it has 
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to submit a deposit per unit of soft-order. The soft-order is later revised 
to become a final order. However, buyer has the option of not sending 
soft-order(s) and only issuing the final order when forecasts are more 
accurate. Note that these soft-orders are not legally binding final orders. 
They are early signals of probable purchase orders.  
(ii) Supplier’s inventory position: If the supplier receives soft-order(s), he 
may start building inventory or wait until receiving the final order. He 
has the option of disclosing his order inventory position with the buyer 
before receiving the final order.  
In the context of information sharing, soft-order(s) can be considered as 
downstream information and supplier’s inventory position as upstream 
information, by the buyer and supplier, respectively. 
1.7 Research focus and questions 
The research focuses on production-inventory management and role of 
cooperative information sharing on cost efficiency and fill rate for the two-player 
supply chain described above. We model a supplier that faces soft-order(s) and 
effective capacity uncertainty and compares her to a supplier that is not given the 
early soft-orders, instead only received the final order under similar capacity 
circumstances. The order fulfillment costs for these two suppliers are compared 
to assess the benefit of transmitting soft-order(s). These two supplier models and 
cost comparisons are used to answer the following specific questions: 
 13
(i) How to plan on production release(s) when soft-orders are received 
and subsequently revised before receiving the final order, in the 
presence of effective capacity uncertainty? 
(ii) What is cost benefit to the supplier from receiving soft-order(s)? 
(iii) What are the benefits to the retailer in terms of order fill-rate for sharing 
soft-order(s)? 
(iv) How does per unit underage cost, overage cost and holding cost effect 
the decision making and cost-benefit tradeoffs? 
These questions are explored in chapter-2. 
 
On the buyer’s side, we model a buyer that faces atypical demand and supply 
uncertainty. The problem considered here is how to generate soft-order(s) and a 
final order given the demand forecast evolution and supply uncertainty. Under 
upstream information sharing case, same replenishment decisions are made 
using additional information regarding supplier’s order inventory position. We 
investigate the following questions: 
(i) How does a buyer facing atypical demand optimally generate soft–
order(s) and a final order given demand forecast revisions, supply 
uncertainty, and deposit cost? 
(ii) How does she make the same decisions if supplier’s order inventory 
position is known? 
(iii) Is knowledge of supplier’s inventory position beneficial to the buyer?  
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(iv) How do benefits very depending on the level of supply uncertainty, 
demand uncertainty, and deposit cost?  
These questions are explored in chapter-3. 
Apart from these specific questions, we also study the interactions of 
various cost parameters, level of demand and supply/capacity uncertainties, on 
the costs incurred by the two supply chain players. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BENEFITS OF ISSUING SOFT-ORDERS UNDER ATYPICAL DEMAND TO 
SUPPLIERS WITH CAPACITY UNCERTAINTY 
2.1 Abstract 
Demand patterns for products with seasonal demand and/or short life-cycles do 
not follow a clear discernible pattern for individual sales events due to such 
factors as product promotions and unforeseen marketplace events. Suppliers 
supporting such “atypical” demand patterns typically incur higher holding costs, 
lower capacity utilization, and lower order fill-rates, particularly under long lead-
times and capacity uncertainty. Sharing of order forecasts, also known as “soft-
orders”, in advance by the buyer could be beneficial to both parties involved. To 
investigate, we model two information sharing scenarios: (1) Supplier receives 
“firm-orders” with a finite and deterministic lead-time; (2) Supplier receives an 
early soft-order with a deterministic due date, however, soft-order revisions are 
allowed at regular intervals. We formulate optimal production scheduling models 
for the supplier under these two scenarios using dynamic programming. We also 
compare the two scenarios through extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Key 
managerial insights offered by this analysis pertain to the impact of sharing early 
soft-orders on the supplier as a function of soft-order accuracy, volatility, timing, 
production capacity, capacity uncertainty, and costs (overage, underage, 
holding). We also look into scenarios where buyers intentionally inflate soft-
orders and study the consequences for both parties involved. 
Keywords: Information sharing, soft-orders, atypical demand, production 
planning. 
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2.2 Introduction 
In recent years, researchers and practitioners alike seem to view effective supply 
chain management and information sharing technology as inextricably linked. 
They are motivated by the possibilities of efficient supply chain planning and 
execution introduced by the information technology (IT) enabler. IT has enabled 
companies to engage in various information-sharing practices, such as 
exchanging sales data, demand forecasts, inventory levels, ordering policies, and 
capacity forecasts with different stages of the supply chain. While the reported 
benefits of information sharing vary considerably (Cachon and Fisher 2000, Lee 
et al 2000), these technologies have substantially lowered the time and cost to 
process orders, leading to impressive improvements in supply chain performance 
(Chen 2003, Sahin and Robinson 2002, Cachon and Fisher 1997, Clark and 
Hammond 1997, Kurt Salmon Associates 1993). More recently, we have even 
seen initiatives such as Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment 
(CPFR), launched to create more effective and collaborative relationships 
between buyers and sellers through shared information (VICS 2004a). Despite all 
this, information sharing still suffers from problems in practice and is not so 
prevalent outside the retail and grocery industries. The major exception is the 
routine exchange of manufacturing resources planning information in supply 
chains through electronic data interchange systems.  
 Demand patterns for product with seasonal demand and/or short product life-
cycles (such as styled goods and trendy consumer electronics) are normally 
“atypical” and do not follow a clear discernible pattern for individual events or 
seasons due to such factors as product promotions and unforeseen marketplace 
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events (Reinmuth and Geurts 1972). In particular, for all those cases where con-
struction of a predictive time-series model for demand forecasting is difficult 
(Hausman, 1969), we term the demand situation atypical. Suppliers supporting 
such atypical demand patterns typically incur higher holding costs, lower capacity 
utilization, and lower order fill-rates, particularly under long lead-times and capac-
ity uncertainty. While they are labeled as atypical situations, they hold opportunity 
for business; increased collaboration between buyer and seller in the form of 
sharing early demand and/or order forecasts and their revisions can reduce the 
likelihood of performance shortfalls.  Further motivation comes from the knowl-
edge that demand from promotional sales are higher compared to usual sales for 
many product segments (Blattberg and Neslin 1990) and out-of-stock problems 
are more severe during promotional events (VICS 2004b).  
 Under atypical demand situations, Terwiesch et al (2005) points out that 
information such as demand forecasts are continually updated as the buyer 
receives new market information that effects demand. Buyer can also share 
order forecasts, also knows as “soft-orders”, and their revisions in advance with 
the supplier. Soft orders are a reflection of buyer’s purchase intent and are not 
legally binding “firm” purchase orders. Supplier may use them to achieve better 
order fulfillment rate without high investment in capacity and inventory. However, 
there is a tradeoff: suppliers that act prematurely through production on any 
given soft-order might face significant future adjustment costs. If the supplier 
happens to be a contract manufacturer, apart from final order uncertainty it faces 
during production decision making, it also needs to consider uncertainty in 
“effective production capacity”. Effective capacity uncertainty can be attributed to 
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inevitable preemptive and non-preemptive factors (such as machine breakdowns, 
preventive maintenance, and yield) as well as uncertainty associated with 
allocation of line/facility capacity to different buyers. Usually, safety inventory is 
used to protect firms against both sources of uncertainty. However, using 
inventory as a hedge against demand and capacity uncertainty can be an 
expensive proposition, especially when holding costs are high (Hu 2003). This 
option may not even be relevant for contract manufacturers that do not build the 
‘same’ product twice.  
 While there is a large body of literature regarding the benefits of sharing 
demand information, there is very little literature pertaining to benefits associated 
with sharing soft-orders, in particular, under atypical demand settings. On the 
contrary, there is more literature that studies advanced firm orders (Karesmen et 
al 2004). Raghunathan (2001) argues that information sharing regarding retailer’s 
actions such as planned promotions, price reductions, and advertising are greatly 
beneficial to the supplier. Our research inquires whether sharing of promotional 
and demand information in the form of order forecasts are beneficial to suppliers 
under capacity uncertainty. While at first glance the answer might seem obvious, 
our results indicate that the accuracy of information being shared (earlier 
forecasts being less reliable than later forecasts), degree of capacity severity 
(i.e., shortage), and capacity uncertainty dictate the final benefits. We quantify 
the potential performance improvements for a supplier under different settings 
and constraints. In particular, we model the supplier facing capacity uncertainty 
under two information sharing scenarios: (1) supplier receives firm-orders for 
seasonal or promotional events with a finite and deterministic lead-time; (2) 
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supplier receives an early soft-order with a deterministic due date, however, soft-
order revisions are allowed at regular intervals, with a final firm-order issued with 
a deterministic lead-time. We formulate optimal production-scheduling models for 
the supplier under these two scenarios using stochastic dynamic programming. 
Hausman (1969) has provided justification for using a dynamic program 
framework in a problem of this setting. This problem involves sequential decision-
making (deciding on production release quantity at the beginning of each period), 
which has a property that later decision (release of next period) may be 
influenced not only by the previous decisions (previous release), but also by 
observable stochastic parameters (such as inventory positions based on actual 
production and (soft) order). We also compare the two scenarios through 
extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Key managerial insights offered by this 
analysis pertain to the impact of sharing early soft-orders on suppliers cost as a 
function of soft-order accuracy, volatility, timing, production capacity, capacity 
uncertainty, and costs (overage, underage, holding). We further quantify the 
benefit of this information sharing on the buyer through calculation of order fill-
rates. We also look into scenarios where buyers intentionally inflate demand 
while issuing soft-order forecasts and study the consequences for both parties 
involved. 
 While it is tempting to consider these buyer supplier interactions in the form of 
a stackelburg game with buyer as a stackelburg leader, the factors under 
investigation (multiple soft-order revisions, capacity uncertainty, demand 
uncertainty, and holding costs) make the problem intractable (see also Metters 
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(1998)). Hence, we choose to take the buyer’s soft-order signals as exogenous 
information. In addition, the insights offered by our analysis are very compelling. 
 Relevant existing literature is reviewed in section 2.3. Detailed formulations of 
the models are presented in section 2.4. The experimental framework for 
assessing the benefits is outlined in section 2.5. Section 2.5 also presents results 
and insights. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2.3 Literature review 
The following sections review related literature and are roughly grouped into the 
following categories: Information sharing under atypical demand and capacity 
uncertainty; Soft-order revision process; Production planning under soft-order re-
vision; and Production planning under capacity uncertainty. 
 
2.3.1 Information sharing under atypical demand and capacity uncertainty 
Chen (2003) and Sahin and Robinson (2002) provide a good review of literature 
regarding the benefits of information sharing in supply chains. For literature on 
production-inventory policies and benefits when sharing advanced “firm-orders” 
in capacitated environments, see Karenmen et al (2004), Simchi-Levi and Zhao 
(2004), and Ozer and Wei (2004). There is essentially no literature that looks into 
atypical demand settings combined with capacity uncertainty (besides capacity 
severity).  
 
2.3.2 Soft-order revision process 
Given that the buyer is issuing advanced soft-orders that are revised at regular 
intervals, any optimal production scheduling model should account for the soft-
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order revision process. Based on the type of signal, the revision process could be 
modeled as a time-series model (if significant inter-temporal correlation exists, 
e.g. Johnson and Thomson 1975) or through a state-space model (e.g. Aviv 
2003). However, as argued by Hausman (1969), not all patterns exhibit proper-
ties that allow use of a time-series model or a state-space model. This is particu-
larly the case for “atypical” demand settings where order forecasts are based on 
new market signals (Reinmuth and Geurts 1972).  
 Literature in general assumes that consecutive soft-orders follow a particular 
distribution with parameters estimated from historical data. As new information 
becomes available, the parameters are revised. For example, Terwiesch et al 
(2005) surveyed a soft-order revision process in a semiconductor industry supply 
chain where the buyer of semiconductor equipment sends soft-orders to equip-
ment manufacturer and revises it periodically as new information is obtained (be-
fore issuing a final firm-order). In terms of modeling the soft-order revision proc-
ess, two approaches are common. The revision process is assumed to follow a 
probability distribution whose parameters can be updated using: 1) Bayesian 
forecast update techniques or 2) through conditional probability distribution 
(CPD) of future order forecasts. An example of Bayesian techniques is Reinmuth 
and Geurts (1972), who present a forecast conditioning model for a farm facing 
atypical demand. Eppen and Iyer (1997) analyze a quick response system in the 
fashion industry through Bayesian updates of the demand distribution. There is 
more literature that employs the CPD technique (e.g., Raman and Kim 2002, 
Gurnani and Tang 1999, Fisher and Raman 1996 and Hausman and Peterson 
1972). Majority of this literature exploits CPD technique based forecast revision 
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for sequential production/inventory management or ordering policy optimization. 
With the exception of Hausman and Peterson (1972) that model the ratios of suc-
cessive soft-order forecasts (log-normally distributed), all the others use a bivari-
ate density model (particularly Gaussian) for successive forecasts.  
 
2.3.3 Production planning under soft-order revision  
Among the earliest of papers that has incorporated a soft-order revision process 
with production scheduling for seasonal demand goods is Hausman and Peter-
son (1972). It is a multi-period and capacitated model with terminal demand 
where the successive order forecast update ratios follow a log-normal process. 
Kaminsky and Swaminathan (2001) consider a forecast generation process that 
depends on forecast bands refined over time for a terminal demand capacitated 
case. Raman and Kim (2002) combine model features from Hausman and Peter-
son (1972) and Fisher and Raman (1996) to demonstrate the impact of holding 
cost and reactive capacity on supplier’s profitability with a real world example.  
 
2.3.4 Production planning under capacity uncertainty 
Suppliers generally face uncertainty in their effective capacity (Lin and Terdif 
1999, Hwang and Singh 1998). Production planning under usual demand uncer-
tainty coupled with capacity uncertain is a concern in management science litera-
ture (e.g. see Ciarallo et al 1994 and Weng and Yigal 1996). Karabuk and Wu 
(2003) have described capacity uncertainty as a critical factor in capacity plan-
ning in semiconductor industry. Lin and Terdif (1999) consider capacity as uncer-
tain while formulating a component partitioning scheme for a printed-circuit-board 
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assembly. Recently, Jemai et al (2006) developed a contracting scheme for a 
two-stage supply-chain in which a supplier facing uncertain capacity sells to a 
retailer facing a newsvendor problem. However, for atypical demand scenarios, 
literature primarily deals with the task of optimal production scheduling of sea-
sonal goods, and we are aware of no work that incorporates capacity uncertainty 
along with inventory holding costs under soft-orders.  
2.4 Model formulation 
This section describes the following: The two scenarios considered for evaluating 
the benefits of information sharing and the sequence of events (section 2.4.1); 
Soft-order revision process (section 2.4.2); Modeling capacity uncertainty (sec-
tion 2.4.3); Production scheduling model for both scenarios (section 2.4.4); Model 
for forecast inflation and information degradation (section 2.4.5); Performance 
measures used to compare the two scenarios (section 2.4.6). Table 2.1 lists all 
the key model variables and parameters. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of key model variables and parameters 
J 
N 
j  
n 
∆l 
l 
Yn  
Yj 
 
YF  
Cj  
Cn  
Number of periods in the total time horizon 
Number of forecast revisions; leads to N+1 stages 
Period index, j = 1,2,…,J 
Stage index, n = 1,2,…,N+1 
Time (number of periods) between two order revisions 
Time (number of periods) between final order and shipment 
Soft order received at the beginning of stage n 
Most recently received soft-order (or final order) in the beginning of period j (State 
Variable) 
Final order sent in the beginning of stage N+1 (State Variable) 
Production capacity for period j 
Production capacity for stage n 
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µj  
σj  
µn  
σn  
fCj 
Rj  
Pj 
Ij  
h  
c0 
cu 
gshipment  
gj 
 
1 ,n nY Yf +   
µn+1,n 
 
Σn+1,n 
 
ρ∆l 
σD  
σn 
mm  
mσ  
mρ 
?  
E(X) 
Ind 
δ(x) 
Average per period capacity 
Standard deviation of per period capacity 
Average per stage capacity 
Standard deviation of per stage capacity 
Probability density function of Cj 
Production release quantity at the beginning of period j (Decision Variable) 
Realized production quantity at the end of period j 
Inventory position at the beginning of period j (State Variable) 
Per unit inventory holding cost per period 
Per unit overage cost incurred on the day of shipment 
Per unit underage cost incurred on the day of shipment 
Actual cost incurred (also called terminal cost) on the day of shipment 
Optimal expected cumulative cost from period j to the day of shipment (Objective 
function) 
 
Joint probability density of two successive (soft) orders, Yn and Yn+1 
  
Mean vector of 
1 ,n nY Yf +  
Covariance matrix of 
1 ,n nY Yf +  
Correlation coefficient between two successive (soft) orders issues ∆l interval apart 
Standard deviation of demand uncertainty on the day of shipment 
Standard deviation of demand uncertainty at the beginning of stage n 
Linear rate of inflation of average soft-order w.r.t. time 
Linear rate of inflation of standard deviation of soft-order w.r.t. time 
Liner rate of degradation of correlation coefficient ρ∆l w.r.t. time 
Normal probability distribution 
Expected value of random variable X 
Indicator function 
Dirac’s delta function 
 
2.4.1 Two scenarios: Information sharing vs. no sharing 
A buyer (a retailer or a distributor) plans for a seasonal or promotional event. 
Based on market information, the buyer updates its demand forecast for the 
product. Given that forecasts made quite early in time are prone to more error, 
buyer has the option of waiting a while to decide on a firm-order quantity to the 
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supplier. Alternatively, based on early assessment of demand, transmit soft-
order(s) before placing a final firm-order. The motivation for issuing soft-orders is 
to improve the odds of receiving a full order by providing the supplier a longer 
lead-time for building the order. In case-1, the “no information sharing” (no-IS) 
case, the buyer does not provide the supplier with order forecasts; rather only 
issues a firm-order quantity with a finite lead-time. In case-2 however, the “infor-
mation sharing” (IS) case, the supplier is provided with an early soft-order with a 
deterministic due date. The initial soft-order is then revised several times before 
giving the supplier a final firm-order with the same finite lead-time. Without loss of 
generality, we assume transportation lead-time to be zero.  
 Figure 2.1 offers a schematic that summarizes the time-lines for both the 
scenarios. It is assumed that the final firm-order, YF, is provided with a lead-time 
of l. In the no-IS case, soft-orders are updated N times (Y1, Y2, Y3, …, YN+1) and 
transmitted to the supplier at finite time intervals, ∆l, before the final order (YF 
=YN+1) is placed (N=3 in figure 2.1). The total timeline is J periods, where J= 
N∆+l. A stage is defined here as the duration between successive forecasts and 
∆l ∆l l Y1 Y2 Y3 YF Shipment
A stage with 
∆l periods 
A period 
Timeline for IS Case
Timeline for no-IS Case
Revised soft-orders Firm order Due dateFirst soft-order 
Figure 2.1: Schematic showing time-lines for the no information sharing (no-
IS) case and the information sharing (IS) case with three soft-orders. 
 j=1                       ∆l                       2∆l                     3∆l                          J=l+3 ∆l 
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the last stage entails the lead-time between issuing the final firm-order and the 
due date (figure 2.1 involves N+1=4 stages). 
Thus, the sequence of events for the No-IS case is: 
Step-1: Buyer sends a final order YF with a due date. Due date is l periods away. 
Step-2: Supplier sends a production release Rj to its production plant on period 
j=1. 
Step-3: Realized production is Pj ≤ Rj and inventory position is Ij = Ij-1+Pj at end of 
period j=1.  
Step-4: Supplier repeats step-2 and step-3 for all the available periods (j=2 to l) 
until either: (a) inventory position reached YF or (b) time for shipment 
reaches. 
Step-5: At the end of period l, supplier ships an amount 1l FI Y+ ≤  (there can be no 
overage in the no-IS case).  
The sequence of events for the IS case: 
Step-1:  Buyer sends a soft-order Y1 with a due date. Due date is l+N∆l periods 
away. 
Step-2:  Supplier sends a production release Rj to its production plant on period 
j=1. 
Step-3:  Realized production is Pj ≤ Rj at end of period j=1. Inventory position 
becomes Ij = Ij-1+Pj. 
Step-4:  Supplier receives soft-order updates (Yn+1) during periods j = n∆l+1, for 
all n=1,2,..,N-1. Based on updated soft-orders and inventory position, 
supplier repeats step-2 and step-3 until either: (a) inventory reaches the 
final firm-order quantity (YF) or (b) due date is reached. 
 27
Step-5: At the end of period l+N∆l, supplier ships an amount less than or equal to 
YF. 
 
2.4.2 Soft-order revision model  
Demand forecasting for an atypical setting is a complex interaction of a number 
of largely unpredictable events or activities such as, overall economic condition, 
competitor’s sales push, emergence of new substitute product etc. It is expected 
that as the buyer comes closer to the planned sale event, more reliable demand 
forecasts emerge. This results in soft-orders more reliable to the supplier. We 
assume that historical data is available to the supplier to construct a model of 
soft-order revision process. In order to couple the soft-order revision model to a 
decision model, we must also assume that the forecasting method used by the 
buyer has not changed significantly and that the underlying stochastic process 
relating to forecast information sources will not change significantly. This implies 
that the forecast data generation model is not going to significantly change in the 
next planning period and hence the soft-order revision model. Having stated that, 
our soft-order data generation model is assumed to be known and we consider it 
exogenous for our analysis of benefits of information sharing. As for the structure 
of the soft-order revision model, we model each pair of consecutive soft-orders 
as a joint distribution; mathematically, we have
1 ,n nY Yf + . Given 1 ,n nY Yf + , the decision 
maker can predict the next possible soft-order (i.e. Yn+1) given the current stage 
soft-order through
1 |n nY Yf + . A quasi-Markovian property is assumed between suc-
cessive forecasts,
1 1 1| ,..., |n n n nY Y Y Y Yf f+ += . Hausman (1969) justifies this assumption and 
provides empirical evidence supporting this property. Hausman (1969) also 
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states that a quasi-Markovian property is important because it allows us to formu-
late a sequential decision problem using a dynamic program without having to 
handle a large number of state variables. This soft-order revision model is flexible 
enough to represent many forecast-generation models discussed in literature. 
For example, the log-normal order forecast revision process model proposed by 
Hausman and Robinson (1972), where the ratio of two consecutive order signals 
follows a lognormal distribution, is a special case of this model. So is the demand 
evolution model proposed by Raman and Kim (2002) that models successive 
demands as Gaussian.  
 An important characteristic we seek in our soft-order revision process model 
is its applicability for achieving a fair comparison of the two information-sharing 
scenarios. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the final firm-orders from the 
buyer to the supplier follow an identical pattern irrespective of sharing early soft-
orders. The process is illustrated in figure 2.2, including the estimation of 
1|n n nY Y yf + = . 
In all numerical experiments, we generate the complete soft-order sequence of 
Y1, Y2,…,YF  and use only YF for the no information sharing case. 
 
2.4.3 Modeling capacity uncertainty  
We assume supplier’s production capacity as constrained and random. Without 
loss of generality, per period capacity, jC , is assumed to be i.i.d. for all j with 
density 
jCf . Based on jCf , the production yield density (Pj) for a given release jR is 
as follows: 
( )Ind(0 ) ( )j j j j
j
P p C j j C j Rj jR
f f p R f dC pδ∞= = ≤ < + ∫   (1) 
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of soft-order revision process with four stages 
(N=3). Ellipses denote joint density contours of successive soft-
orders, while the bell curves denote conditional density of next soft-
order given a soft-order. Capital Y denotes soft-order random variable 
where as y denotes a realization during a particular season. 
Figure 2.3: Relationship between capacity uncertainty and produc-
tion uncertainty given a particular release (Rj). 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
f3,2 
fYF|y3
y2 
y3 
YF 
y1 
fF,3
f2,1 
fY3|y2
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C jR
f dC
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where, Ind is the indicator function and δ is the Dirac’s delta function with the fol-
lowing properties: 
Ind(0 ) 1      0
                           0  
j j j jp R if p R
elsewhere
≤ < = ≤ <
=   (2) 
,    
( )
0,       
j
Rj j
j
p Rj
p
p Rj
δ ∞ ==  ≠    (3) 
These mechanics are illustrated in figure 2.3. It shows that the probability of pro-
ducing jR  is the sum of all the probabilities of realizing a capacity more than or 
equal to jR . On the other hand, the probability of producing less than jR is equal  
to the probability of realizing that much capacity to produce. Right hand side of 
the equation 1 is integral to the cost formulation presented in the next sections. 
 
2.4.4 Production-scheduling model for the no-IS case 
Supplier makes one final shipment and a unit underage cost of cu is incurred on 
the day of shipment. In addition, a unit holding cost of h per period is incurred 
based on the production pattern. Over production is not a possibility in the no-IS 
case for the supplier initiates production after receiving the final order. With the 
presence of capacity uncertainty, we can optimally schedule production (i.e., de-
termine releases) for the l periods using backward dynamic programming. Let, jI  
denote inventory position at the beginning of the thj period and jP  is the actual 
production of the thj period. The (underage) cost incurred at the end of shipment 
(end of period J) holds the following relationship: 
 ( ) [ ( )]shipment J J u F J Jg I P c Y I P ++ = − +   (4) 
where JP denotes the quantity produced during period J.  
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At the beginning of period J, the expected cumulative cost from the beginning of 
period J to the end of shipment is 
0
( ) ( )J
j j
J J J
R
shipment J J C J shipment J J C JC C R
g I C f dC g I R f dC
∞
= =+ + +∫ ∫ , where JR  denotes the 
“production release’ quantity for period J and actual production yield ( JP ) less 
than or equal to JR . There is obviously no holding cost term given that the order 
is being shipped at the end of the period. The task is to determine the optimal 
production release quantity JR  that minimizes this cost: 
 
0
( ) Min ( ) ( )J
j j
J J J J
R
J J shipment J J C J shipment J J C JR C C R
g I g I C f dC g I R f dC
∞
= =
 = + + + ∫ ∫      (5) 
The general recurrence relation for any period j  (including the last period) is:  
 
( )( )
( )
10
1
( )
( ) Min ,    1,..,
( ) ( )
j
j
j
j
j
j j
R
j j j j j C jC
j j R
j j j j j C jC R
g I C HC C f dC
g I j J
g I R HC R f dC
+=
∞
+ =
 + + = = + + +  
∫
∫
  (6) 
where, the holding cost function jHC  is defined as cost incurred for producing a 
quantity x in the period j and carrying to the day of shipment (i.e. period J). Note 
that this way of defining holding cost doesn’t incur a holding cost for the period in 
which the product is produced: 
 ( )( )jHC x hx J j= −   (7) 
 
2.4.5 Production model for the IS case 
As in the no-IS case, supplier incurs an underage cost of cu or unit overage cost 
of c0 based on mismatch between realized production and final order. A unit 
holding cost of h per period is incurred based on production pattern. Let, jI and 
jY denote inventory position and the most recently received soft-order forecast or 
final order quantity, respectively, at the beginning of period j. While the produc-
tion planning is done on a period by period basis, the revised forecasts are avail-
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able only on a stage by stage basis. Therefore, 1j jY Y+ =  for those successive pe-
riods with no new forecast update. Overall, two sets of recursive equations are 
necessary for these two cases in deriving the optimal release orders.  
Similar to (4), the sum of overage and underage costs incurred at the end of 
shipment is: 
[ ] [ ]( , ) ( ) ( )shipment J J F o J J F u F J Jg I P Y c I P Y c Y I P+ ++ = + − + − + .  (8) 
Once again, using backward dynamic programming, one can derive the following 
recurrence relations for determining the optimal production release quantities for 
all periods. For all 1j n l= ∆ − , 1,2...,n N= , the recurrence relations involve soft-
order revision and can be expressed as follows: 
 
0
( , ) Min ( , ) ( , )j
j j
j j j j
R
j j j j j j j C j j j j j C jR C C R
g I Y G I C Y f dC G I R Y f dC
∞
= =
 = + + +  ∫ ∫  (9) 
where 
 
1
1
1 1 | 1=0
( , ) ( ) ( , ) d
j j
j
j j j j j j j j j Y Y jY
G I P Y hP J j g I P Y f Y++
∞
+ + ++ = − + +∫  (10) 
For all 1j n l≠ ∆ − , 1,2...,n N= , the recurrence relations involve no soft-order revi-
sion and can be expressed as follows: 
 
( )
( )
0
( , ) ( )
( , ) Min
( , ) ( )
j
j
j
j
j
j j
R
j j j j j C jC
j j j R
j j j j j C jC R
g I C Y hC J j f dC
g I Y
g I R Y hR J j f dC
=
∞
=
 + + − =  + + + −  
∫
∫
  (11) 
 
2.4.6 Modeling forecast inflation and information degradation 
In the context of sharing early soft-order forecasts, poor forecasting on the part of 
the buyer induces forecast volatility to the supplier (Terwiesch et al 2005). Fore-
cast volatility also arises as soft-orders based on preliminary information are 
transmitted to supplier at a point when the buyer still faces substantial uncertainty 
about the market demand (market volatility). While forecast volatility could be an 
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unavoidable condition, forecast inflation or manipulation can be considered an 
opportunistic behavior: buyer places inflated soft-orders hoping to obtain a higher 
order fill-rate. We investigate the impact of these two elements, degree of fore-
cast volatility and degree of forecast inflation, on the supplier as well as the 
buyer, with two objectives. First, we study the cost and order fill-rate conse-
quences to supplier and buyer, respectively. Secondly, we investigate the extent 
to which the above dynamic programming model can compensate the behavior 
of soft-order inflation, in particular, under the condition that the supplier pos-
sesses historical knowledge that buyer inflates soft-order forecasts and is aware 
of the degree of inflation in an expected sense.  
 It is a commonly accepted notion that longer forecast horizons lead to fore-
casts that are more uncertain. As illustrated in figure 2.4, a linear model is em-
ployed here to model forecast volatility and degradation of certainty with time. 
Amplitude of standard deviation of the soft-order forecast distribution ( jY ) is used 
as a measure of forecast uncertainty and is modeled as 
( )( 1)n D m N n l lσσ σ= + − + ∆ + , where nσ  denotes the standard deviation of the 
soft-order forecast distribution at the beginning of stage n, Dσ  the standard de-
viation of demand uncertainty on the day of shipment, and mσ  the slope of the 
degradation model. In estimating nσ , it is necessary to use the standard deviation 
of demand uncertainty on the day of shipment, Dσ , as a base for facilitating a fair 
comparison between the two information sharing scenarios (for the duration of 
the last stage, l, is common to both cases). Given that our formulation models the 
joint density of successive soft-orders, it is also necessary to address the effect 
of correlation between two consecutive soft-orders. We assume that this correla- 
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Figure 2.4: Forecast inflation (c) and information degradation models (a 
and b). 
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-tion strictly depends on the stage duration, i.e. l∆ , and is also modeled linearly 
as 1 ( )l m lρρ∆ = − ∆ , where lρ∆  is the correlation coefficient. This model implies 
the following: Correlation coefficient is one if two successive soft-orders are is-
sued at the same instant and correlation degrades linearly with time at a rate of 
mρ . 
As for intentional order inflation, we once again employed a linear model: 
( )( ) ( ) ( 1)n F mE Y E Y m N n l= + − + ⋅ ∆ , where E(Yn) denotes the mean of the soft-
order distribution at the beginning of stage n, E(YF) the mean of final firm-order 
distribution, and mm  the slope of soft-order mean inflation. These relations are 
also illustrated in figure 2.4. 
 
2.4.7 Performance measures for comparison of information sharing scenar-
ios 
The different information sharing scenarios will be compared based on supplier’s 
expected costs (holding, overage, and underage costs) as well expected order 
fill-rates to the buyer (fraction of the final firm-order). It is assumed that the sup-
plier makes one final shipment on the due date asked by the buyer. Holding cost 
is incurred for keeping finished goods and overage and underage costs are in-
curred on the day of shipment. Overage costs are possible only when forecasts 
are updated; therefore, for no-IS case, this cost component is not applicable. 
Costs are denoted as follows: oc for unit cost of overage, uc for unit cost of under-
age, and h  for holding cost per unit per time-period. The expressions for the cost 
performance measures are as follows. For the No-IS case: 
 ( )( ) [ ( )] ( )u F J J j jE TC E c Y I P HC P+= − + +   (12) 
For the IS case, the cost expression is: 
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 [ ] [ ]( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )o J J F u F J J j jE TC E c I P Y c Y I P HC P+ += + − + − + +   (13) 
where, ( )j jHC P is defined in equation (7). 
For both the cases, the expected order fill-rate is: 
    if    ,  0
( )
    1        if     
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F j F
F j
F j
j
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Y P Y
YE FR E
Y P
  > ≠ =  ≤   
∑ ∑
∑
  (14) 
In expressions (12), (13) and (14) the expectation is taken over all possible varia-
tions on soft-orders and production yield coupled with the decision being taken at 
each period of the production process. In the numerical evaluation section of this 
research, the expected values are computed through Monte Carlo simulations of 
optimal release policies. 
2.5 Numerical experiments 
In this section, we numerically analyze how modification of different cost parame-
ters, lead-time, forecast uncertainty/inflation, and capacity shortage/uncertainty 
affect the two players (i.e., the supplier as well as the buyer). The supplier’s order 
fulfillment cost and the order fill-rate it delivers to the buyer depends on all these 
parameters.  
Numerical evaluation involves the following steps. First, optimal production 
scheduling models for all the selected combinations of parameters are executed 
and the resulting optimal policies are stored. Then, the Monte Carlo simulation is 
performed that primarily involves two tasks: i) Generation of soft-order forecasts 
and final firm-order quantities based on the selected soft-order revision process. 
ii) Determination of optimal production release orders based on stored optimal 
policies, and in turn, computation of supplier’s expected cost and order fill-rate.  
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Figure 2.5: (a) Period level release policy. (b) Aggregate stage level re-
lease policy. While holding cost is ignored for production during the period 
of production for the period level policy, this is not the case in the stage 
level model. 
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Given the nature of the dynamic programming formulations, modeling capacity 
uncertainty and production at an aggregate level for stages rather than individual 
periods offers significant advantage in terms of computing time (resulting in three 
to four fold reduction in some cases). While this approximation leads to a small 
bias in determining holding costs, for ease of simulation, we have adopted the 
aggregate optimization and simulation strategy. 
 
2.5.1 Aggregate production plan for stages 
Firstly, we derive the capacity per stage (Cn) from the capacity per period model 
(Cj) (assuming capacity per period is independent). Then, we compute an optimal 
aggregate release order Rn for every stage of production instead of every period 
of production. However, without the detailed production schedule for every pe-
riod, it becomes necessary to approximate the computation of holding cost. The 
assumption that holding cost is not incurred during the “stage” of production but 
incurred during subsequent stages will introduce significant bias in assessing the 
difference between expected total cost of IS case and No-IS case, since No-IS 
case contains a single stage. Hence, a reasonable holding cost approximation for 
a stage is derived as follows. Given the realized production for any stage as Pn , 
we assume that it is realized through uniform production over duration Tp. Here, 
we define TP as the time taken to produce an amount Pn in a stage of length ∆l:  
 
   if    ( )
( )
                 if    ( )
n
n n
n
n n
P l P E C
E C
l P E C
= ∆ <
= ∆ ≥
PT   (15) 
These relations are illustrated in figure 2.5 (b) and can be best visualized by 
comparing triangles A1B1C, AB0C, and ABC. The resulting holding cost expres-
sion is: 
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( )( ) ( )2n n n n
hHC P P hP N n l l= + − ∆ +PT   (16) 
 In this expression, the first term is the holding cost for that stage and the sec-
ond term is the holding cost for remaining periods (with due date ( )J N n l− − ∆  
periods into the future). This modified formulation is implemented for deriving the 
optimal production “release” patterns. For the No-IS case, we no more need a 
dynamic program. Optimal policy becomes a rule that can be stated as follows: 
release quantity Rl is equal to the order quantity YF. Assuming Rl units are pro-
duced during the lead-time l, supplier’s expected cost under this policy becomes: 
 ( ) ( [ ] ( ))u F N N NE TC E c Y P HC P+= − +   (17) 
In the IS case, as periods are aggregated into stages, unlike in period by period 
scheduling, we no longer need to derive two sets of recursive expression for in 
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+ + ++ = + +∫( , ) ( ) ( , ) .  (19) 
Modifications in the expressions for performance measures are straightforward; 
we simply replace number of periods J with number of stages N and period index 
j with stage index n in equations (13)-(15). 
 
2.5.2 Framework for numerical analysis  
All numerical evaluations presented here are based on 1.5 million simulation 
runs. Table 2.2 provides the common framework for all the simulations while the 
subsections below discuss the framework for studying the different effects. Dur-
ing optimization and simulation of various scenarios, we approximate the con-
tinuous probability distributions functions with probability mass functions defined 
over a set of discrete values. Capacity is always bounded between 
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[0, 4.5 ]n nµ σ+ , where nµ is the expected capacity per stage and nσ  the standard 
deviation of stage capacity.  
 
Table 2.2: Common framework for all numerical experiments 
 
 Information Sharing Case(IS) 
No Information Sharing 
Case (No-IS: ∆l=0) 
Number of revisions 
(N) 3 0 
Number of stages 
(N+1) 4 1 
Final order lead-time l l 
Total number of pe-
riods (J) N∆l+l l 
Soft-order revision  
model 
1 2 12 12~ ( , )( , )f Y Y Σµ?  
2 3 23 23~ ( , )( , )f Y Y Σµ?  
3 3 3~ ( , )( , )F F Ff Y Y Σµ?  
N.A. 
Per pe-
riod 
2( , )j jµ σ?  2( , )j jµ σ?  
Per 
stage 
2 2( , ) ( , )n n j j
periods
µ σ µ σ= ∑? ? 2 2( , ) ( , )N N j j
l
µ σ µ σ= ∑? ?  Production capacity 
Bounds [0, 4.5n nµ σ+ ] [0, 4.5N Nµ σ+ ] 
Final order YF YF 
We caution here that while care has been exercised in conducting these nu-
merical experiments to best extract and illustrate the dynamics at play, all the 
while coping with a large number of parameters, the patterns/effects reported can 
change somewhat as a function of the parameter levels. However, the essential 
dynamics/insights from these results are expected to hold strongly in most set-
tings. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows: Section 2.5.3 outlines the ef-
fect of firm-order lead-times as well as soft-order revision lead-times on supplier’s 
total order fulfillment cost as well as order fill-rate to buyer. Sections 2.5.4 and 
2.5.5 jointly study the impact of soft-order quality degradation with lead-times.  
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Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l = 4, µC=6, σC=2, co=1, cu=1.5, 
h=0.05, mm=0, mσ=0.3, mρ=0.045. 
Figure 2.6: Effect of time between order forecast revisions on sup-
plier’s cost.  
Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l=[1,2,3,4,5], µC=6, σC =2, co=1, 
cu=1.5, h=0.05, mm=0, mσ=0.3, mρ=0.045.
Figure 2.7: Effect of total order lead-time on supplier’s cost. 
4 6 8 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
∆l
E(
C
os
t)
E(UC) 
E(OC) 
E(TC) 
E(HC) 
5 10 15 20
40
60
80
100
120
140
l+3∆l
E(
TC
)
∆l=0
0
0
0
0
∆l=1
1
1
1
1
∆l=2
2
2
2
2∆l=3 3
3
3
3
5
4 4 4 4
∆l=
4
5 55 5
∆ l=0 =>Only Final Order 
∆ l≠0 =>Soft-Order 
 42
While section 2.5.4 studies the impact of degradation of standard deviation of 
soft-orders, section 2.5.5 studies the impact of degradation in correlation be-
tween soft-orders and final firm-order. Section 2.5.6 studies the impact of “inten-
tional” efforts by the buyer to deceive the supplier through systematic soft-order 
inflation. Lastly, section 2.5.7 studies the impact of capacity uncertainty.  
 
2.5.3 Effect of lead-times (l and ∆l) 
While longer order lead-times are preferred by suppliers for the ability to reduce 
underage costs without having to commit large amounts of capacity to individual 
buyers and/or resort to overtime, they expose increased risk to buyers, attribut-
able to placing orders based on early demand forecasts. While sharing soft-order 
forecasts can partially address this dilemma, relying too heavily on very early 
soft-order forecasts (large number of revisions (N) and/or large durations be-
tween revisions (∆l)) also increases suppliers risk (attributable to potential for 
over production). This section investigates these tradeoffs through a variety of 
experiments. For example, while increasing ∆l effectively increases capacity of a 
stage, it also degrades the correlation between two adjacent soft-orders, and 
hence, increasing the uncertainty associated with final firm-order. These affects 
captured through numerical evaluations are illustrated in figures 2.6 and 2.7.  
 Figure 2.6 illustrates the effect of ∆l on expected total order fulfillment cost to 
the supplier. It can be seen that increase in ∆l decreases the total cost initially, 
attributable to significant reduction in underage costs from extra capacity. How-
ever, beyond a certain point, the marginal benefit is zero, and the cost can actu-
ally increase due to increased forecast volatility. As expected, holding cost  
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Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l=4, µj=6, σj=2, co=1, cu=1.5, h=0.05, 
mm=0, mρ=0.05. 
Figure 2.9: Effect of (soft) order variability on order fill-rate. 
Figure 2.8: Effect of (soft) order variability on supplier’s cost. 
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mm=0, mρ=0.05. 
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increases with ∆l while underage cost decreases. Given the underage cost trend, 
it can be easily inferred that the order fill-rate would increase with ∆l, however, 
with diminishing returns. The zero overage cost for experiments reported in figure 
2.6 can be attributed to the fact that, on average, final demand is E(YF)=100 and 
only 24% of that demand (i.e., E(C)/ E(YF)) can be produced after receiving the 
final order. Therefore, to incur overage, the volatility of the soft-orders has to be 
so huge that the supplier produces more than 100% of the order before receiving 
the final order. Such behavior can be introduced by increasing the values of mσ 
and mρ.  
 Figure 2.7 plots the expected order fulfillment cost to the supplier as a func-
tion of total order lead-time (l+∆l). Unlike results from figure 2.6, here we also 
study the impact of final order lead-time (l). It shows that increasing the total 
lead-time (l+∆l) decreases supplier’s cost. Also, receiving soft-orders (i.e. cases 
when ∆l≠0) are always beneficial. However, the marginal benefit of increasing 
total lead-time beyond a certain point is zero. It could even be negative, as we 
will see in subsequent sections. Another observation from figure 2.7 is that ex-
pected cost for certain combinations of l and ∆l are found to be same (e.g., con-
sider the pair (l=4, ∆l=1) and (l=1, ∆l=2)). This implies that providing a final order 
with a sorter lead-time could be just as effective as issuing soft-orders earlier. 
Thus, these experiments are able to reveal the dynamics in play. The plots 
clearly demonstrate the benefit of sharing early soft-orders, at least, at the speci-
fied parameter levels. Obviously, significantly increasing the final order lead-time 
will diminish the value of soft-orders. However, as explained earlier, this is not 
necessarily acceptable to buyers that  have to  place orders  based  on very early 
 45
Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l = 4, µj=6, σj=2, co=1, cu=1.5, 
h=0.05, mm=0, mσ=0.3. 
Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l=4, µj=6, σj=2, co=1, cu=1.5, 
h=0.05, mm=0, mσ=0.3.
Figure 2.10: Effect of correlation between successive (soft) orders 
on supplier’s cost 
Figure 2.11: Effect of correlation between successive (soft) orders 
on supplier’s cost 
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demand forecasts. 
 
2.5.4 Effect of order variability (mσ ) 
Our experiments investigate the impact of forecast uncertainty on supplier’s order 
fulfillment cost as well as buyer’s order fill-rates by varying the mσ (increasing mσ 
linearly increases the standard deviation or uncertainty of order forecasts as a 
function of lead-times). Overall, as expected, both performance measures de 
grade with increasing mσ for a given ∆l. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 illustrate cost and 
order fill-rate effects, respectively.  
 It is already evident from section 2.5.3 that short soft-order revision lead-times 
(given a fixed number of revisions) does increase supplier’s order fulfillment cost 
while reducing order fill-rates to the buyer. This explains the overall trends in fig-
ures 2.8 and 2.9. Figure 2.9 also illustrates that the cost is indifferent to mσ at low 
levels of ∆l (e.g., ∆l ≤2). The reason being that cost is so severely dominated by 
the low capacity constraint, that the effect of mσ  becomes secondary. Further 
comparison of figures 2.8 and 2.9 reveals that while order fulfillment costs are 
insensitive to low levels of ∆l(≤2), order fill-rates are insensitive even at slightly 
higher levels of ∆l(≤3). This implies that while total cost is dominated by the ca-
pacity constraint, the order fill-rate is favored by higher variability level if capacity 
is highly constrained. Another important observation from figure 2.9 is the down-
ward trend in the order fill-rate as ∆l increases beyond a certain limit. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the corruptive influence of order volatility begins to out-
weigh the benefits of increased effective capacity from a larger ∆l. 
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Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l = 4, µj=6, σj=2, co=1, cu=1.5, h=0.05, 
mσ=0.3, mρ=0.05. 
Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l=4, µj=6, σj=2, co=1, cu=1.5, h=0.05, 
mσ=0.3, mρ=0.05. 
Figure 2.12: Effect of systematic soft-order inflation on supplier’s cost
Figure 2.13: Effect of systematic soft-order inflation on order fill-rate
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2.5.5 Effect of correlation between successive soft-order forecasts (mρ) 
As noted earlier, correlation between successive soft-order forecasts strongly af-
fects the predictability of final firm-order based on earlier soft-orders. The affects 
of degradation in this correlation are illustrated in figures 2.10 and 2.11. As ex-
pected, stronger correlations (lower mρ values) are favorable for both the supplier 
and the retailer. It is clear that both the cost and fill-rate graphs are fanning out at 
higher levels of ∆l, meaning that the interaction between ∆l and mρ is significant 
at higher soft-order revision lead-times. These behaviors can be explained in a 
manner similar to that of figures 2.8 and 2.9. A small ∆l implies a higher correla-
tion but with a lower capacity. Therefore, the cost (order fill-rate) is high (low). 
From the production planning point of view, low correlation is never good whether 
capacity is constrained or not (figure 2.10). However, the order fill-rate seems to 
improve with lower correlation in the region between 4≤∆l≤6. 
 
2.5.6 Effect of intentional but systematic soft-order inflation (mm) 
From figures 2.12 and 2.13, it can be seen that systematic soft-order inflation has 
no effect when capacity is tight. With no forecast inflation (i.e. mm= 0), increasing 
capacity decreases cost; however, from order fill-rate point of view, there exist an 
optimal ∆l for which the order fill-rate is maximum (∆l=7 for mm= 0). For high de-
gree of inflated soft-orders (e.g. mm≥1.5), the supplier’s cost goes up dramatically 
after passing a point of minimum (e.g. for mm= 1.5, the cost is least at ∆l=4).  
 Two important insights can be drawn from these graphs. Firstly, for a given 
∆l, increasing the degree of inflation increases the order fill-rate while also in-
creasing the order fulfillment cost to the supplier. This implies that the buyer al-
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ways benefits (receives a better order fill-rate) from issuing inflated soft-orders, 
while it hurts the supplier. Secondly, the proposed dynamic programming formu-
lation is not robust enough to fully compensate for these soft-order inflations, in 
spite of the systematic (linear) pattern, and is fully appropriate only when the soft-
orders are not inflated. The overall difficulty can be attributed to the interaction 
between soft-order inflation and order volatility. We hypothesize that the dynamic 
programming formulation is likely to more effectively counter systematic soft-
order inflation at lower levels of order volatility. In addition, we believe that the 
ability of dynamic programming technique to counter soft-order inflation will also 
be a function of the inflation pattern. While we only investigated a particular type  
of systematic inflation pattern (linear), other patterns such as step-shifts will be 
considered for further study.  
 
2.5.7 Effect of capacity severity and uncertainty ( nµ  and nσ ) 
As expected, figure 2.14 illustrates that increasing the expected capacity de-
creases the expected order fulfillment cost to the supplier. This is because in-
creasing the capacity allows the supplier to postpone production without incurring 
any increase in underage cost, while decreasing the holding cost. The plot also 
illustrates that the detrimental effect of capacity uncertainty is more when the 
mean effective capacity is less (or when capacity is constrained). Moreover, the 
marginal benefit of increasing capacity decreases as we keep increasing capac-
ity.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
Our analysis reveals that suppliers supporting “atypical” demand patterns, arising 
say from promotional marketing efforts, seasonal and/or short product life-cycles, 
and contract manufacturing, can benefit from receiving early soft-order forecasts 
from the buyer. Our analysis also reveals that such information sharing is also 
beneficial to the buyer in terms of order fill-rate. The dynamic programming for-
mulations offered allow for soft-order revisions and can determine optimal pro-
duction release targets for individual production periods under capacity uncer-
tainty. We also identify several different dynamics at play, as a function of order 
lead-times, soft-order volatility, and reliability of soft-orders. The benefit of receiv-
ing soft-orders depends primarily on the degree of capacity shortage and uncer-
tainty. Volatility in soft-orders is detrimental to both the players, resulting in in-
Parameters: E(YF)=100, σd=7, l = 1, ∆l=1, co=1, cu=1.5, h=0.05, mm=0, 
mσ=0.5, mρ=0.25 
Figure 2.14: Effect of capacity severity and uncertainty on supplier’s cost
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creased order fulfillment costs while lowering order fill-rates. Although receiving 
early soft-orders improves the supplier’s ability to complete the order, early fore-
casts are often more uncertain, increasing the risk of over production. An optimal 
lead-time for sharing soft-orders can be determined based on the levels of effec-
tive capacity, demand forecast uncertainty, and the different cost parameters. 
 We also demonstrate that the dynamic programming technique cannot fully 
account for intentional soft-order inflation by the buyer, even under conditions of 
a stable and linear order inflation pattern. The analysis reveals that the buyer has 
an incentive to inflate soft-orders at a cost to the supplier. This suggests that any 
contract offered by the supplier to the buyer should incorporate penalties for soft-
order inflation. Future studies will look into optimal penalty structures for inflation.  
 Presently, efforts are also under way to study the optimal soft-ordering policy 
for a retailer facing atypical demand and supply uncertainty. In addition, we will 
study the benefits of upstream information sharing (such as production inventory) 
for such retailers.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AN OPTIMAL SOFT-ORDER REVISION POLICY FOR A VENDOR FACING 
SUPPLY UNCERTAINTY AND UPSTREAM INFORMATION  
 
3.1 Abstract 
Atypical demands are highly volatile and unsuitable for regular forecasting. In 
such cases, vendors utilize market signals to do demand forecast updating. Early 
soft-orders are transmitted to the supplier to avoid supply shortages. We 
determine an optimal soft-order revision policy for a vendor facing atypical 
demand and supply uncertainty in a single selling season based on a stochastic 
dynamic program. The decision variables are soft-order(s) and final firm-order 
quantities to be transmitted to the supplier. We also demonstrate the value of 
upstream information sharing, such as a supplier sharing order inventory 
information at regular intervals with the vendor. The contributions of this paper 
are: (i) A decision model for vendor to optimally revise soft-orders with or without 
supplier’s order inventory position. (ii) We establish the relationship between 
optimal soft-orders and final firm-order under demand forecasts, demonstrating 
that optimal orders may be inflated, deflated, or match the forecast. (iii) We 
identify circumstances under which sharing of supplier’s order inventory 
information is beneficial to vendor. A detailed analysis explores the structure of 
the optimal ordering policies and the effect of cost parameters and the different 
sources of uncertainty on vendor performance. 
Keywords: Soft-orders; supply uncertainty; upstream information sharing; atypical 
demand 
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3.2 Introduction 
In the current global and highly competitive marketplace, the product lifecycle is 
continually shortening. Vendors selling short life cycle products (such as styled 
goods and trendy consumer electronics) face increasing pressure in determining 
replenishment order quantities for their seasonal sales and promotion events. 
Although everyday low price (EDLP) strategy is being promoted by retailer 
Walmart and others as the solution to tame the highly detrimental bullwhip effect 
in supply chains, instruments like promotion and price reduction during seasonal 
sales are a commonplace. Demand patterns of style products during seasonal 
sales are rather “atypical” attributable to complex interactions between many 
intractable events, resulting in such demand behaviors that may not exhibit a 
clear discernible pattern (Reinmuth and Geurts 1972). Today software vendors 
are providing a myriad of packages to cope with uncertain situations and sales 
planning for promotional and seasonal events. However, every competing vendor 
has access to such tools. Only those vendors capable of squeezing every bit of 
inefficiency and customer dissatisfaction out of the system through better 
forecasting and planning to best match supply and demand are going to win in 
the marketplace.  
 The replenishment decision making for vendors becomes difficult if such 
unpredictability down-stream is supported by an up-stream supply source that is 
geographically distant, resulting in longer replenishment lead-times. To start the 
planning process early in time, vendors should involve experts/expert methods 
that assimilate all the complex yet relevant market information and estimate an 
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early sales forecast. Early forecasts in such situations are extremely helpful for 
both the vendor and the supplier. By issuing reasonable soft-orders based on 
these early forecasts, long before the start of the sale, vendor allows the supplier 
to better plan for and support the sales event. These soft-orders are tentative 
orders from buyer to supplier; they are reflection of buyer’s purchase intent but 
not legally binding “firm” purchase orders. Those suppliers that do not have in-
house forecasting capability or do not have forecasting capability for that 
particular product are completely dependent on such signals for early production 
planning. Moreover, if the supplier happens to be a contract manufacturer that 
does not build the same product twice, these signals become even more 
important. If the vendor is a trustworthy player or commits a deposit amount for 
every soft-order she submits, the supplier may even start building inventory 
based on such soft-order. Such early information sharing in terms of soft-ordering 
is beneficial for the supply chain in terms of achieving higher order fill-rates for 
the vendor as well as increasing sales for the supplier. Higher order fill-rates 
without soft-ordering would have been otherwise possible only through either 
investing in huge reactive capacity capable for last minute “just in case” 
production ramp-ups or through building up inventory that may have to be 
marked down with loss if demand does not occur. 
 Replenishment decisions become more difficult with increase in uncertainty 
(both supply uncertainty as well as demand uncertainty). In case of atypical 
demand situations that we just described, construction of a predictive time series 
model based on simple observation of demand is difficult (Hausman 1969). In 
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such cases, we depend on simple statistical models such as joint distributions of 
consecutive demand forecasts and basic statistics such as correlations for 
decision support. We have seen that this way of capturing demand uncertainty 
for atypical situation has gained preference in the literature (see literature review 
by Raman and Kim 2002). Although literature predominantly focuses on demand 
side uncertainty, supply side uncertainty is relevant in many industries and not 
very well explored in developing optimal procurement policies. As stated by Lee 
(2002), supply uncertainty results from supplier source capability; elements and 
activities associated with a supply system are not free from frequent breakdowns, 
unpredictable and low yields, poor quality, limited supply capacity, inflexible 
capacity, evolving production process, and life cycle position of product. 
Heightened alertness towards quality control in production process and superior 
condition based maintenance practice may lower uncertainty due certain factors 
like frequent breakdown, unpredictable low yields, and poor quality. In contrast, 
increased complexity in production system, frequent overhauling of assembly 
system due to change in product design, thrust towards flexible production 
system, reconfigurable production, frequent change of suppliers for components 
and raw materials due to better visibility of market price will have a negative 
impact on supply uncertainty. Today, computing power allows us to build models 
capable of optimizing a policy considering more sources of uncertainty that we 
could not have done few decades earlier. Therefore, policies should incorporate 
supply source uncertainty, which if not considered, results in a suboptimal 
decisions and hence negatively influence the profit potential. 
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 One of the key topics of investigation in this research is the way soft-ordering 
decisions are made in atypical demand situations described above. We have 
shown earlier that soft-orders decrease supplier’s cost and increases buyer’s fill-
rate (Baruah and Chinnam 2006). We now ask the following follow up questions:  
Is there any information the supplier can share that will help the vendor better 
assess its demand or supply? While the supplier can collaborate in developing 
demand forecasts for the buyer, this is not our focus. Considering that the supply 
side uncertainty is mostly a result of supplier’s production and operational 
processes, we seek opportunities for upstream information sharing to reduce this 
uncertainty. One paper has investigated the effect of upstream inventory 
information sharing in reducing bullwhip effect through simulation modeling of a 
serial supply chain (Croson and Donohue 2005). In our modeling framework, we 
investigate the effect of the sharing supplier’s production information on vendor’s 
replenishment policy and show how this information interacts with optimal soft-
ordering behaviors: What soft-order is optimal based on her early assessment of 
the demand and supply uncertainty? What final order to place. To model this 
scenario, we employ a two-stage stochastic dynamic program framework that 
generates optimal soft-order and final firm-order given a demand evolution model 
and supply uncertainty model. A slightly modified model answers the same set of 
questions when supplier shares his inventory position while buyer makes the 
decision on final order. We have shown that sharing production information by 
supplier helps the vendor reduce its expected cost. 
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 Subsequent sections are organized as follows. Section 3.3 reviews the 
related literature. Section 3.4 presents the dynamic programming model for soft-
order and final firm-order determination. Section 3.5 presents mathematical 
analysis that establishes the benefits of upstream inventory information sharing. 
Section 3.6 presents results and insights from numerical analysis followed by 
conclusion in section 3.7. 
 
3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Optimal ordering policy under demand and supply uncertainty 
While the production/inventory models have been studied in the 
operations/production management literatures for decades, involving 
uncertainties in the environment, the attention however has been mostly focused 
on probabilistic modeling of demand side uncertainty (Yano and Lee 1995, Gullu 
et al 1999). Many sophisticated procedures are developed to determine 
procurement quantities and their timings optimally or near optimally while 
demand is uncertain. In actuality, considering realization of sure delivery times 
and/or receipt of exact quantity ordered may not be proper assumptions (Gullu et 
al 1999). There may be many reasons why supply could be uncertain (Lee 2002): 
frequent breakdown, unpredictable and low yields, poor quality, limited supply 
capacity, inflexible capacity, evolving production process, and life cycle position 
of product. Industries where random yield is known are: electronic fabrication and 
assembly (Karabuk and Wu 2003), chemical processes, and finally procurement 
from suppliers that produce imperfect products are common across any industry. 
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In fact, it is a common occurrence in a wide range of manufacturing and service 
scenarios (Vollmann et al. 1997). A good literature review on supply/yield 
uncertainty can be found in Yano and Lee (1995) and Mohebbi (2004). For some 
related work in microeconomics, see Amihud and Mendelson (1983).  
 There is a long history for this research, starting with earlier works by Karlin 
(1958) and Silver (1976). Karlin (1958) considered a periodic review model with 
random yield where ordering was restricted to a fixed amount. Silver (1976) 
studied an EOQ model where the quantity received is a random proportion of the 
quantity requisitioned and finally derived an EOQ formula that accounts for such 
supply uncertainty.  This concept of proportional supply uncertainty is used by 
Shih (1980) and Ehrhardt and Taube (1987) to study single period inventory 
model with random demand and random replenishment. An optimal order-up-to 
policy is studied by Henig and Gerchak (1990) considering periodic review model 
where the quantity received is random multiple of the order size. Ciarallo et al. 
(1994) showed optimality of order-up-to type policies for a stochastic demand 
production/inventory model with random available capacity. Similar capacity 
uncertainty model is used by Gullu (1997) that contracts an order-up-to level 
through the use of queuing systems. Parlar and Berkin (1991) formulated an 
EOQ model where supply is available or disrupted for random duration in 
planning horizon. In another study, Parlar et al. (1995) consider a periodic review 
model with Markovian supply availability structure in which supply is either fully 
available or completely unavailable. 
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 More recently, Kouvellus and Minler (2002) studied the interplay of demand 
and supply uncertainty in capacity and outsourcing decisions in multistage supply 
chains. One of the important findings of this paper is that greater supply 
uncertainty increases the need for vertical integration while greater demand 
uncertainty increases the reliance on outsourcing. Wu and Lin (2004) have 
studied an (r, Q) inventory model under lead-time and ordering cost reductions 
when the receiving quantity is different from the ordered quantity. They 
simultaneously optimize the order quantity, reorder point, ordering cost, and lead-
time with the objective of minimizing the total relevant costs. Mohebbi (2004) 
considers a continuous-review inventory system with compound Poisson demand, 
hyper-exponentially distributed lead-time, and lost sales where the supply 
process maybe randomly interrupted depending on the availability of a supplier. 
He assumed that the supplier’s availability can be modeled as an alternating 
renewal process in which the on and off periods are independent random 
variables following general and hyper-exponential distributions, respectively. 
Bopllapragada et al. (2004) has modeled two-stage serial inventory systems 
under demand and supply uncertainty and customer service level requirements. 
Their supply model incorporates both quantity and timing uncertainty. Yang and 
Malek (2004) extended the newsvendor approach to study multi-supplier 
sourcing with random yields. A double-layered supply chain is considered where 
a buyer (vendor) facing the end users has the option of selecting among a cohort 
of suppliers; suppliers have different yield rates and unit costs. Kim et al (2004) 
propose a decision model for ordering quantity considering uncertainty in supply-
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chain logistics operations. They model uncertainty due to unforeseeable 
disruption or various types of defects (e.g., shipping damage, missing parts and 
misplacing products). Given that commonly used ordering plans developed for 
maximizing expected profits do not allow retailers to address concerns about 
contingencies, their research proposes two improved procedures with risk-averse 
characteristics towards low probability and high impact events. While all the 
papers we have discussed so far models production/inventory systems to cope 
with supply/ yield uncertainty, Lin and Hou (2005) have considered an inventory 
system with random yield in which both the set-up cost and yield variability can 
be reduced through capital investment. Objective is to determine the optimal 
capital investment and ordering policies that minimize the expected total annual 
costs for the system. 
 None of the papers discussed above have researched ordering policies under 
forecast revision. This is because research on soft-ordering is very recent. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to study optimal soft-ordering under 
demand and capacity uncertainty, and in particular, under upstream information 
sharing. 
 
3.3.2 Optimal ordering policy under forecast revision and supply 
uncertainty for short life-cycle products  
Analytical models for managing inventory for short lifecycle products share these 
common features, according to Fisher et al. (2001): First, all are stochastic 
models, because they consider uncertainty explicitly. Second, they consider a 
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finite selling period at the end of which unsold inventory is marked down in price 
and sold at a loss. These models are similar to the classic newsvendor model. 
Third, they model multiple commitments such that sales information is obtained 
and used to update demand forecasts between planning periods. The “finite-
selling periods” and “multiple production commitments” are two unique 
characteristics of style goods inventory models that differentiate them from 
stochastic inventory models. 
 Style goods inventory problems are studied by Murry and Silver (1966), 
Hausman and Peterson (1972), Bitran et al. (1986), Matsau (1990), Fisher and 
Raman (1996) and Raman (1999). While these papers capture the demand side 
uncertainty through a forecast revision model initially proposed by Hausman 
(1966), Baruah and Chinnam (2006) have proposed a modified model that 
captures capacity uncertainty through probability distributions.  
 Research that specifically relates to replenishment decision by the vendor in 
atypical demand situations is sparse. Four papers are of interest: Bradford and 
Sugre (1990), Eppen and Iyer (1997a), Eppen and Iyer (1997b) and the most 
recent one being Raman et al. (2001). Bradford and Sugre (1990) present a 
model of the two-period style-goods inventory problem for a firm, which stocks 
many hundreds of distinctive items having heterogeneous Poisson demands. 
The model uses Bayesian procedure for forecast and probability revisions based 
on an aggregate-by-item scheme. They derive optimal inventory stocking policies, 
which maximize expected profit during the season based on revised forecasts. 
They have used negative binomial distribution for modeling aggregate demand 
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behaviors. Eppen and Iyer (1997a) developed an updated Newsboy heuristic 
based on Bayesian updates of demand to derive an optimal inventory policy that 
determines an original order based on a demand forecast, and later, how much 
to divert to the other sources of distribution when actual demand is observed. A 
stochastic dynamic program framework is used to model this for individual item 
demand case. Eppen and Iyer (1997b) model a backup agreement for a catalog 
retailer. Backup agreement is a scheme to provide upstream sourcing flexibility 
for fashion merchandise. In a backup agreement, retailer places an initial order 
before the start of the season and reorders during the selling season based on 
actual demand and customer return rate. This agreement uses a penalty cost for 
not buying a unit in the second period that is committed in the first period. Raman 
et al (2001) optimize initial and replenishment order quantities that manimize cost 
of lost sales, back orders, and obsolete inventory through a two-stage stochastic 
dynamic program. Their model is an upgrade of Bradford and Sugre (1990). 
While Bradford and Sugre do not consider the impact of replenishment lead 
times, Raman et al do. In addition, solution procedure of Bradford’s model is 
through complete enumeration, which works efficiently for smaller problems.   
 None of these models consider a scenario where a soft-order is issued in the 
first stage and final order in the second stage with a finite lead-time. The model 
we present incorporates them. We have incorporated a deposit scheme 
associated with the soft-order that is different from Eppen and Iyer’s (1997b) 
backup agreement penalty cost. Compared to these above models, our model 
provides insights in three new dimensions: 1) impact of soft-orders on vendor 
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performance, 2) allowing supply uncertainty as opposed to deterministic supply 
system, and 3) assessing the value of upstream production information sharing. 
 
3.3.3 Value of upstream supply chain information for buyers 
Supply chain management literature on information sharing typically studies 
scenarios when information comes from demand side, typically, a downstream 
supply-chain player sharing the information with upstream supply chain player. 
According to Chen (2003), upstream information sharing research has received 
relatively little attention. Examples of upstream information sharing studied in 
literature are supplier cost, lead-time information, supplier's capacity information, 
and inventory information. 
 Chen (2001) has studied the procurement problem faced by a buyer who has 
multiple suppliers to select from and shows the potential for supply chain 
improvement if suppliers are willing to share cost information. Chen and Yu 
(2005) have quantified the value of lead-time information sharing in a single-
location inventory system. A typical supplier knows the lead-time of order 
fulfillment, when the retailer submits a replenishment order. They show that 
sharing it with the retailer whose replenishment orders are based on periodic 
review inventory model with an infinite planning horizon has benefits. Chen and 
Yu (2001) have studied value of upstream capacity information based on a one 
retailer one supplier model. This single selling season has uncertainty in 
supplier's capacity. The model permits two orders, one early in time when 
supplier possesses infinite capacity and a second order during which capacity is 
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assumed uncertain. They compare two scenarios based on supplier's willingness 
to share its future capacity forecast with the buyer. Another study by 
Swaminathan et al (1997) studies the influence of sharing supplier capacity 
information (available-to-promise capacity) on the performance of a supply chain. 
Their model is a manufacturer who orders raw materials from two alternative 
suppliers differing in cost and capacity. They have studied different information 
sharing scenarios based on optimal inventory policy for the manufacturer facing 
stochastic demand while exact capacities of supplier are unknown. One of their 
findings is that while information sharing is beneficial to overall supply chain 
performance, it can be detrimental to individual entities. They have found trade 
offs between benefit of extra information versus cost of adoption of information 
system. The study by Croson and Donohue (2005) is the only paper we found 
that is related to our findings regarding upstream inventory information sharing. 
Although their simulation modeling framework is not at all related to the scenario 
we model, one of their inferences is similar to ours. They have shown that access 
to upstream inventory information provides a forewarning of when suppliers are 
running short of inventory and thus lessen a decision maker’s tendency to 
overreact when the order he receives from his supplier falls short of his original 
order request. Thus, it helps in reducing bullwhip effect. They state that benefits 
from sharing upstream inventory information are not as significant when 
compared to benefits from sharing downstream inventory information, as far as 
bullwhip is concerned. This result however could be dependent on the level of 
demand versus supply uncertainty a process faces. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of key model variables and parameters 
ti 
F1 
F2 
D 
Y1 
Y2 
P1 
 
C2 
P2 
 
Q 
c0 
Time stamp at the beginning of a stage 
First demand forecast made by the buyer (State variable) 
Second demand forecast (State variable) 
Actual demand for the sales event or season 
Soft-order sent to the supplier (Decision variable) 
Final order (Decision variable)  
Supplier’s production during the first stage after receiving Y1 (State variable in IS 
case) 
Supplier’s capacity in the second stage  
Supplier’s production during the second stage after receiving Y2 (State variable in IS 
Case) 
Supplier’s shipment order quantity  
Unit overage cost 
, Q ,Y2YI
F1 F2 
Shipment 
Arrives from 
supplier 
First forecast 
is assessed 
Forecast 
modified 
First soft-order is 
transmitted 
Final order 
quantity is 
placed 
Stage-1 Stage-2
Control Y1 Y2 
No information sharing (No-IS) F1 F2 
Information sharing (IS) F1 F2, P1 
P2
Figure 3.1: Schematic showing timeline of events for the buyer. P1 is known 
to buyer only if shared by supplier. 
D 
Actual demand 
observed 
t1 t2 t3
P1
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cu 
z 
g3 
gj 
 
gjs 
 
Gj 
Gjs 
FR 
Rd 
Nd 
µ21 
Σ21 
µ21 
Σ21 
k1 
CV1 
k2 
CV2 
µP1|Y1 
σP1|Y1 
µP2|Y2, P1 
σP2| Y2, P1 
?  
fX 
EX,Y(U) 
Ind 
δ(x) 
Unit underage cost 
Unit deposit cost that accompanies a soft-order 
Actual cost incurred after realizing actual demand  
Optimal expected cumulative cost from stage j to realization of actual demand in No-
IS case (Objective function) 
Optimal expected cumulative cost from stage j to realization of actual demand in IS 
case (Objective function) 
An intermediate cost function used in No-IS case for ease of manipulation 
An intermediate cost function used in IS case for ease of manipulation 
Order fill-rate to the buyer 
Portion of deposit amount returned to buyer 
Net deposit amount paid by buyer after receiving the order 
Mean vector of F1 and F2 
Covariance matrix of F1 and F2 
Mean vector of F2 and D 
Covariance matrix of F2 and D 
Ratio of average production in stage-1 to soft-order Y1 
Coefficient of variation of production in stage-1 
Coefficient of variation of capacity in stage-2 
Ratio of average capacity in stage-2 to shortage Y2−P1  
Mean production during stage-1 given the soft-order 
Standard deviation of production during stage-1 given the soft-order 
Mean capacity of stage-2 given the final order and production of stage-1 
Standard deviation of capacity at stage-2 given final order and production of stage-1 
Normal probability distribution 
Probability density function for random variable X 
Expected value of function U w.r.t. random variables X and Y 
Indicator function 
Dirac’s delta function 
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3.4 Model formulation 
3.4.1 Two scenarios: Information sharing vs. no sharing 
A buyer (a vendor or a retailer or a distributor) plans for seasonal or promotional 
event. Buyer does forecasting (F1) based on market information and sends the 
supplier a tentative soft-order quantity (Y1). Supplier produces a quantity P1 
based on this order before receiving a final firm-order. The buyer updates her 
forecast based on new market information, F2. The time between receiving Y1 
and Y2 is denoted stage-1. Once F2 is known, buyer sends the supplier a final 
order of Y2. Based on this final order, supplier produces P2 before the order is 
due. This production quantity depends on whether Y2>P1 or not. If Y2 ≤ P1, then 
P2=0 with probability 1. Within a finite period of receiving Y2, supplier ships a 
quantity Q  that can never exceed what has been ordered (Y2). 
 In the so called information sharing case (abbreviated as IS case), the 
supplier shares how much he had produced in stage-1 (i.e. P1) in response to 
buyer’s soft-order (Y1). This information is transmitted to the buyer at the end of 
stage-1. Buyer now can estimate the amount to be produced in stage-2 (i.e. P2) 
by subtracting the Q from P1. In addition, he can estimate 1 1|P Yf  and 2 2 1| ,P Y Pf  based 
on historical information and uses them to model the supply uncertainty (detailed 
below). This model along with the demand uncertainty model (described below) 
allows the retailer to determine the optimal Y1 and Y2 based on optimal cost 
computation. 
 In the no information sharing case (abbreviated as No-IS case), supplier does 
not reveal P1 to the buyer. Hence, the buyer cannot estimate 1 1|P Yf  and 2 2 1| ,P Y Pf . 
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However, he estimates
1 2| ,QY Yf  and the demand uncertainty model as in IS case to 
determine optimal Y1 and Y2 order quantities. 
 Figure 3.1 offers a schematic that summarizes the time-lines for both these 
scenarios. The sequence can be described as follows. For the No-IS Case: 
Step-1:  Buyer determines and issues an optimal soft-order (Y1) to the 
supplier based on her initial forecast (F1) of the demand.  
Step-2:  Within a finite time period, based on new market information, buyer 
adjusts her forecast (F2) of the demand and places a final order (Y2) 
to the supplier with a due date. 
Step-3:  Supply is received (Q≤ Y2) on the due date and actual demand (D) is 
observed. 
 
The sequence of events for the IS Case is as follows: 
Step-1:  Buyer determines and issues an optimal soft-order (Y1) to the 
supplier based on her initial forecast (F1) of the demand. 
Step-2:  Within a finite time period, based on new market information, buyer 
adjusts her forecast (F2) of the demand. Supplier reveals to buyer 
how much he has produced (P1) based on her soft-order (Y1). Buyer 
places a final order (Y2) to the supplier with a due date. 
Step-3:  Supply is received (Q≤ Y2) on the due date and actual demand (D) is 
observed. 
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3.4.2 Modeling the forecast revision process 
It is typically the case that forecasts are updated based on new market 
information with individual forecasts for a particular season, in the beginning of 
each stage (say F1 and F2).  We assume that F1 and F2 are average point 
forecasts of the actual demand D. The forecast evolution is modeled as follows: 
(F1,F2) and (F2, D) are assumed to follow joint Gaussian distribution 2 1F Ff ,  and 2,D Ff  
with known parameters, and are assumed to be independent 
2 1 2, ,F F D Ff f⊥ . 
Historical information will be necessary to estimate these distributions. Figure 3.2 
illustrates how the conditional order (
2 1|F Ff ) and conditional demand ( 2|D Ff ) are 
computed for a given season given the joint densities. 
 
3.4.3 Modeling the supply uncertainty 
In the presence of soft-order revision process, supplier will attempt to use some 
type of an optimal production planning process to decide on the production 
release quantities, based on the transmitted (soft) orders. However, the buyer 
could only see the supplied quantity as a response to its (soft) orders. From the 
history of such responses, buyer can assess the model of supply uncertainty 
given the orders i.e.
1 2| ,QY Yf . If supplier shares how much he has produced in 
stage-1 in response to Y1, then buyer’s belief about the supplier’s production 
uncertainty in each stage can also be assessed, i.e. 
2 2 1| ,P Y Pf and 1 1|P Yf . It is clear that  
the marginal uncertainty associated with the shipment quantity ( Qf ) given no P1 
information sharing should perfectly match the IS Case. In another words, the 
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Figure 3.2: Illustrating the forecast revision process. The joint density contour 
of (Y1, Y2) and (Y2, D) are shown by ellipse, while the conditional densities are 
shown through the bell curves. The capital Y’s represent random variable and 
small y’s represent a particular value for a season. 
F1 
F2 
 
fF2,F1 
fD|f2 
f1 
f2 
D 
fD,F2 fF2|f1 
In the 
beginning of 
stage-1 
At the end of 
stage-1 
Y1 Y2 
P2P1 
In the 
beginning of 
stage-2 
At the end of 
stage-2 
(a)Production uncertainties (b)Supply uncertainty 
At the end of 
stage-2 
In the 
beginning of 
stage-1 
Y1 Y2 
Q 
In the 
beginning of 
stage-2 
Figure 3.3: Causal relationship between the (soft) order quantities and the
production quantity are shown in (a). The belief diagram in (b) shows the no 
information sharing case 
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model of supply uncertainty (
1 2| ,QY Yf ) should be logically related with production 
uncertainties (
2 2 1|P Y Pf − and 1 1|P Yf ). The goal of this section is to establish this 
relationship. 
 
Proposition 1: P1 and P2 are conditionally independent: 1 1 2 1 2| | ,P Y P P Yf f⊥ . 
 
Proof and explanation: The cause and effect relationships between (soft) orders 
transmitted from buyer and the supplier production is graphically illustrated as a 
causal model in figure 3.3. The network represents how soft-orders are 
responsible for production response. Arcs between nodes denote the existence 
of a direct relationship. Direction of arc represents the flow of effect. This network 
is the buyer’s perception of supplier’s response. In figure 3.3(a), we have shown 
arcs between Y1 and Y2 and between Y2 and P1. However, for the buyer, these 
two relationships cannot be estimated from historical data. 
 From figure 3.3(a) we get, 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2, , , | | , | ,. . .Y P Y P Y Y Y P Y Y P P Yf f f f f=   (1) 
where, 
 
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 2
1 2 1 2
, , | | ,
| ,
, ,
. .P Y Y P Y Y P Y Y
P Y Y
Y Y Y Y
f f f f
f
f f
= =
  (2) 
That results in, 
 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2, , , | | , | ,. . .Y P Y P Y P Y Y P Y P P Yf f f f f=   (3) 
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From equation (2) we get
1 1 2 1 2| | ,P Y P P Yf f⊥ . (In the above equations, we can replace 
2 1 2| ,P P Yf with 2 2 1|P Y Pf −  given the fact that P2 is strictly dependent on order shortage Y2-
P1only and nothing else. Therefore, 2 2 1 2 2 1| , |P Y P P Y Pf f −= .) 
 
Now, we establish the relationship between
1 2| ,QY Yf , 1 1|P Yf and 2 1 2| ,P P Yf .  
 
Proposition 2: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 11, 2 1 1 1 1 21 2 1
1 1 2
| | 1 2 | 1|0
. Ind(0 ) ( )
P q P
Q q Y Y P Y P Y Yq P Y PP P Y
f f f dP q Y f dP qδ= =∞= − −= == ≤ ≤ +∫ ∫  
 
Proof and explanation: 
Following inequalities holds: 
 Q≤Y2  (4)  
 Q=P1+P2 if Y2>P1  (5) 
 Q ≤ P1      if Y2≤P1   (6) 
From the above three relationships, we can graphically plot the relationships 
between Y1, Y2, P1, P2 and Q as in figure 3.4. Now, from probability theory, if 
Q=P1+P2 and 1 2 2 2 1| | ,P Y P Y Pf f⊥  
1 2 2
1 2 1
2 2 1 1 1
1 2
1
1 2 1 1 1
1
1 2
| , 2 | 10 0
| , | 10
( ) { }
                   
                   
P P Y
P q P q P
P Y P P YP P
P q
q P Y P P YP
F Q q P P P q
f dP f dP
F f dP
+ ≤
= = −
= =
=
−=
= = + ≤
=
=
∫ ∫
∫   (7) 
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(a) Triangle (0y2y2) is the region where possible combination of P1 
and P2 values lie that satisfies Q=P1+P2. 
(b) Probability of P1≥ y2 so that a point (P1,P2) falls within the triangle 
(0y2y2) and its effect on P(Q) 
Q=P1+P2 
P1
P2 
Y2=y2 
Y
2=
y 2
 
(0,0) y2
y2 
Q<P1+P2 
P
2≤
 y
2 
Figure 3.4: Illustrating (a) the feasible region for P1 and P2 and 
combination of values of P1 and P2 that results in Q=P1+P2; (b) 
Probability of P1≥Y2 obtained from conditional probability of P1|Y1. 
Y
2=
y 2
 
P1 
1 1|P Yf  
P1 
1 2| ,Q Y Yf  
2 2( | 0)P Q y P= =  
1 1
2
| 1P Yy
f dP
∞∫  
2 2( | 0)P Q y P= ≠  
a
cb
ab+ac
2 2 1|P Y Pf −
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By differentiating, 
 
1 2 2
1
2 2 1 1 1
1
1
1 2 1 1 1
1
1 2
| , | 10
| , | 10
( ) { }
                   
                   
P P Y
P q
q P Y P P YP
P q
q P Y P P YP
f Q q P P P q
d F f dP
dq
f f dP
+ ≤
=
−=
=
−=
= = + ≤
=
=
∫
∫
  (8) 
Note: The above expression is not a convolution between 
1 2 1| ,q P Y Pf − and 1 1|P Yf given 
the fact that for a given Y1=y1, the shape of 1 1|P Yf and 1 2 1| ,q P Y Pf − changes. We can 
visualize it as a dynamic convolution of two conditionally independent 
distributions. 
 
We also know that manufacturer’s second stage production does not exceed final 
order Y2, i.e. P2≤Y2. Therefore, the only way P1+P2≥ Y2 is possible is if P1≥Y1 and 
P2=0. If P1≥Y1, then at the beginning of second stage P(Q=Y2) =1. 
Mathematically, 
 ( )12 2 1 1 2
1 2
| 0 | 1 ( )
P
Q Y P P Y YP Y
f f dP qδ=∞= = == ∫   (9) 
From equations (8) and (9) we clearly see that Y2=P1+P2 can happen in two 
ways: (a) P1+P2 = Y2 such that P2=0 or (b) P1 ≥ Y2 with P2=0. Now we can write 
the expression for supply uncertainty as: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 11, 2 1 1 1 1 21 2 1
1 1 2
| | 1 2 | 1|0
. Ind(0 ) ( )
P q P
Q q Y Y P Y P Y Yq P Y PP P Y
f f f dP q Y f dP qδ= =∞= − −= == ≤ ≤ +∫ ∫   (10) 
where, Ind is the indicator function and δ is the Dirac’s delta function with the 
following properties: 
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 2 2Ind(0 ) 1      0
                           0  
q Y if q Y
elsewhere
≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤
=   (11) 
 
2
2
2
,    
( )
0,       Y
q Y
q
q Y
δ ∞ ==  ≠    (12) 
 
3.4.4 Cost structure for the buyer 
Buyer incurs following costs in our models. For every unit unsold at the end of 
the season or promotional sale, buyer incurs an overage cost of c0. For every 
unit of unmet demand, buyer also incurs an underage cost of cu. Shipment from 
supplier is received on the day of sale and therefore buyer incurs no holding 
costs.  
Our model also incorporates a stylized deposit scheme associated with the 
soft-order Y1 to ensure that buyer places a reasonable soft-order (and not 
intentionally inflate the soft-order to improve order fill-rate). In this scheme, a 
deposit of z dollars is made to the supplier for every unit of soft-order. Paying this 
amount upfront ensures that the buyer has no incentive for making highly inflated 
soft-orders. While this deposit should act as a deterrent for inflated soft-orders by 
buyers, it should not be a panelizing factor for buyers that are conservative in 
issuing soft-orders. In addition, deposit should not result in situations where 
supplier simply takes a soft-order and earns a deposit without finally shipping any 
good. To counter all these limitations, we have devised a deposit return scheme 
as follows. If deposit with soft-order Y1 is zY1, then the return to the buyer on the 
day of the shipment is Rd, 
 ( )1 1 2. .dR zY z FR Y Y += − −   (13) 
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 22
2
   if   0
1      if   0
Q Y
YFR
Y
 >=  =
  (14) 
FR stands for fill rate for the buyer. Time value of money is not accounted here. 
The overall scheme works as follows: 
I. If the final firm-order exceeds the soft-order, Y2 ≥ Y1, buyer gets credit for 
the complete deposit, i.e. Rd = kY1. 
II. If supplier shipped nothing, Q = 0, buyer gets credit for the complete deposit. 
III. If Y2 < Y1, supplier gets to keep a part of the deposit based on what he has 
supplied: 
? if supplied 100% of Y2, i.e. FR = 1, Rd = zY2  
? if supplied   x% of Y2, i.e. FR = x, Rd = zY1−z.(Y1−Y2) 
? if supplied   0% of Y2, i.e. FR = 0, Rd = zY1, same as (ii) 
Now, net deposit cost that is incurred to the buyer is kY1−Rd i.e. 
 ( )1 2. .dN z FR Y Y += −   (15) 
 
3.4.5 Model to make optimal Y1 and Y2 decisions 
The sum of overage, underage, and net deposit costs incurred by the buyer at 
the end of shipment is: 
 3 1 2 0( , , , ) ( ) ( )u dg Q D Y Y c Q D c D Q N+ += − + − +   (16) 
Based on the sequence of events, it is clear that the decisions to be made (Y1 
and Y2) depend on the information available at time instants t1and t2. It is evident 
that information at t2 includes all the information of t1, however, the reverse may 
not be true; in other words, no information is lost in progression of time. Our cost 
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optimization model is in the form of a backward dynamic program (DP) because 
the DP paradigm fits perfectly to this kind of a decision-making problem. 
 
Making decision Y2 at t2  
Expected cost w.r.t. demand at t2 is written as:  
 
22 2 1 2 3 1 2 |0
( , , , ) ( , , , )
D
D FD
G Q F Y Y g Q D Y Y f dD
=∞
== ∫   (17) 
Now, the expected cost w.r.t. both demand and supply at t2 depends on whether 
2 2 1|P Y Pf − (IS case) is known or 1 2| ,QY Yf (No-IS case) is known.  
In the No-IS Case, the expected cumulative cost is minimized: 
 2
1 2
2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 | ,0
( , ) ( , , , )
Q Y
QY YY Q
g Y F Min G Q F Y Y f dQ
=
== ∫   (18) 
For the IS-Case, the cost becomes: 
 
2 2 1
2 2 1
2
2
2 2 1 2 | 2 2 10
2 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 2 1
( , , , ) ,    
( , , )
( , , , ),                                
P Y P
P Y Ps P
Y
G Q F Y Y f dP if Y P
g Y F P Min
G Q F Y Y if Y P
= −
−=
 >=  ≤
∫   (19) 
Here, the upper suffix s in g denotes the IS-Case (s stand for “shared 
information”). 
 
Making decision Y1 at t1 
Expected cost based on demand forecast at t1 for the No-IS-Case is,  
 2
2 1
2
1 1 1 2 1 2 | 20
( , ) ( , )
F
F FF
G Y F g Y F f dF
=∞
== ∫   (20) 
and for the IS-Case, 
 2
2 1
2
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 | 20
( , , ) ( , , )
Fs s
F FF
G P F Y g P F Y f dm
=∞
== ∫   (21) 
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The minimization based on whether 
1 1|P Yf is known or not becomes: 
 
1
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( , )Yg F MinG Y F=   (22) 
 1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 | 10
( ) ( , , )
Ps s
P YY P
g F Min G P F Y f dP
=∞
== ∫   (23) 
 
3.5 Establishing the benefits of upstream information sharing 
This section investigates the benefit of sharing P1. We show that, in comparison 
with the no information sharing case, optimal Y1 and Y2 with sharing P1 do not 
worsen the expected cost of the retailer.  
 
Proposition 3: Let the initial demand forecast be F1, soft-order sent to supplier be 
Y1, and P1 the production during the first stage. Based on whether P1 is shared or 
not shared, for a given value of F2, expected optimal total cost incurred by retailer 
at time t2 holds the following relationship: 2 2sg g≥ . 
 
Proof:  
Case-1: 2 1Y P>  
Partitioning the integral in g2 as: 
 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
2 | , 2 | , 2 | ,0 0
Q Y Q P Q Y
QY Y QY Y QY YQ Q Q P
G f dQ G f dQ G f dQ
= = =
= = == +∫ ∫ ∫   (24) 
where, G2 stands for G2(Q, F2, Y1, Y2). 
For any fixed P1, LHS and the two parts of the RHS are positive. 
 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2 1
2 | , 2 | ,0
Q Y Q Y
QY Y QY YY YQ Q P
Min G f dQ Min G f dQ
= =
= =∴ ≥∫ ∫   (25) 
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For Y2 > P1, Q = P1 + P2, therefore, 
 2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 2 1
1 2
2 | , 2 | , ,0
Q Y P Y P
QY Y P Y Y PQ P P
G f dQ G f dQ
= = −
= ==∫ ∫   (26) 
From the physics of the production process, we know that 2P  is independent of 1Y  
if Y2 and P1 is known. From the graph in figure 3.4  
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
, , , | | , | ,
| , , | ,
, , | | ,
. . .
. .
P P Y Y Y Y Y P Y Y P P Y
P Y Y P P P Y
P Y Y Y Y Y P Y Y
f f f f f
f f
f f f f
= = =   (27) 
Hence, 
 2 2 2 1
1 2 2 2 1
2 2
2 | , 2 |0 0
Q Y P Y P
QY Y P Y PY Q P
Min G f dQ G f dQ
= = −
−= =≥∫ ∫   (28) 
 
Case-2: 2 1Y P≤  
When 2 1Y P≤ , the supply quantity becomes 2Q Y= . This is true whether 1P is 
shared or not.  
We know that for any function f(X, Y), the following is true: 
 | ( , ) ( , )QYY YMinE f Q Y Min f Q Y≥   (29) 
Hence, 
 2
1 2
2 2
2 2 1 2 | , 2 2 2 1 20
( , , , ) ( , , , )
Q Y
QY YY YQ
Min G Q F Y Y f dQ MinG Q Y F Y Y
=
= ≥ =∫   (30) 
 
Proposition 4: Expected total optimal cost under upstream production inventory 
information sharing is always less than or equal to total optimal cost under no 
information sharing, i.e. 3 3( ) ( )sE g E g∀∀ ≥ , where E∀  and sE∀  stand for expectation 
over all possible variations in No-IS and IS cases, respectively. 
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Proof:  
We know the following: 
13 1( ) ( )FE g E g∀ =   (31) 
1 13( ) ( )
s s
FE g E g∀ =   (32) 
Therefore, if we prove 1 1sg g≥ , proves the proposition. 
We have, 
2 1 2 1| 2 | 2( ) ( )
s
F F F FE g E g≥ . Then, using Proposition 3, 
 ( )1 1 2 1 2 1
1 1
| | 2 | 2( ) ( )sP Y F F F FY YMinE E g MinE g≥   (33) 
If the above is true for all possible values of F1, then, 
 ( )1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1
| | 2 | 2( ) ( )sF P Y F F F F FY YE MinE E g E MinE g
   ≥      (34) 
Or, 1 1sg g≥ . 
 
The above discussion and results clearly show that upstream production 
inventory information sharing by the supplier cannot deteriorate the performance 
of the soft-ordering policies for the buyer.  
 
3.6 Numerical analysis 
In this section, we numerically analyze how modification of different cost 
parameters, forecast uncertainty, and capacity shortage/uncertainty affect the 
expected total cost of the buyer. Numerical evaluation involves the following 
steps. First, optimization models for all the selected combinations of parameters 
are established and optimal policies are stored. Then, the expected total cost is 
computed by taking expectation over the all possible variations.  
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 The section is organized as follows: section 3.6.1 discusses the framework for 
numerical analysis; section 3.6.2 illustrates the optimal decision surfaces and 
optimal costs w.r.t different state variables; section 3.6.3 outlines the 
performance measures used for comparing the IS Case with the No-IS case; 
section 3.6.4 discusses the effect of different policy parameters on expected 
costs. 
 
3.6.1 Framework for numerical analysis 
The section describes specific statistical models used to model demand revision 
process and the capacity uncertainty in the supply side. The demand revision 
process are assumed to follows joint Gaussian model with known parameters; 
i.e. parameters of 
2 1, 21 21~ ( , )F Ff Σµ? and 2, 2 2~ ( , )D F D Df Σµ?  are known. Stage 1 
production uncertainty is assumed to follow a conditional Gaussian distribution 
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
| | |( , )~P Y P Y P Yf µ σ? with following parameters: 
 
1 1| 1 1P Y k Yµ =   (35) 
 
1 1 1 1| | 1P Y P Y CVσ µ=   (36) 
This model of production in stage-1 depends on the order size Y1. This 
represents a scenario when the supplier will setup a capacity for the first stage 
based on the retailer’s soft-order. k1 = 1 will be equivalent to a supplier who 
believes in the buyer’s soft-order and installs a capacity that is on an average 
sufficient to make the full soft-order Y1. Assuming that the uncertainly linearly 
adds up as the size of the production capacity is increased, we use a constant 
coefficient of variation in production CV1. Please note that the model of stage-1 
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production is such that production quantity P1 can be equal to, less than or more 
than Y1. However, while modeling the stage-2 production we have to model it 
such that P2 ≤ Y2−P1, since supplier will never produce more than the shortage 
amount, if Y2 ≥ P1. To derive such a production model we first model the capacity 
of stage-2 as a Gaussian model and derive the production model out of it. Stage-
2 capacity is assume to follow
2 2 2 1 2 2 1
2
| , | ,( , )~C C Y P C Y Pf µ σ? with following parameters: 
 
2 2 1| , 2 2 1( )C Y P k Y Pµ = −   (37) 
 
2 2 1 2 2 1| , | , 2C Y P C Y P CVσ µ=   (38) 
This model of capacity model is constrained and random. Based on
2Cf , the 
production yield density (P2) would be: 
 ( )2 2 1 2 2 2 1
2 1
| , 2 2 1 2 2Ind(0 ) ( )P Y P C C Y PY Pf f P Y P f dC Pδ
∞
−−= ≤ < − + ∫   (39) 
Figure 3.5: Illustrating the relationship between stage-2 capacity uncertainty 
and stage-2 production uncertainty  
C2 
2Cf  
P2
Y2−P1
2
2 1
2CY P
f dC
∞
−∫  2P
f  
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where, Ind is the indicator function and δ is the Dirac’s delta function with 
following properties: 
 2 2 1 2 2 1Ind(0 ) 1      0
                                 0  
P Y P if P Y P
elsewhere
≤ < − = ≤ < −
=   (40) 
 
2 1
2 1 2
2
2 1 2
,    
( )
0,       Y P
Y P P
P
Y P P
δ − ∞ − ==  − ≠    (41) 
Meaning of the equation 39 is illustrated in the figure 3.5. It shows that probability 
of producing as much as the shortage quantity Y2 − P1 is sum of all the 
probabilities of realizing a capacity more than or equal to the shortage. On the 
other hand probability of producing less than shortage is equal to probability of 
realizing that much capacity to produce. 
 Capacity C2 and production P1 is bounded between [ ]1 1 1 1| |0, 4.5P Y P Yµ σ+  and 
[ ]2 2 1 2 2 1| , | ,0, 4.5C Y P C Y Pµ σ+ respectively. Demand forecasts, capacity, and production 
are always whole numbers. During optimization of various scenarios, we 
approximate the continuous probability distributions functions with probability 
mass functions defined over a set of discrete values. We caution here that while 
great care has been exercised in conducting these numerical experiments to best 
extract and illustrate the dynamics at play, all the while coping with a large 
number of parameters, the patterns/effects reported throughout the manuscript  
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Figure 3.6: Structure of the optimal decision (soft-order) in IS and No-IS case in 
the beginning of stage-1. 
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Figure 3.7: Structure of the optimal cost for IS and No-IS case in the beginning of 
stage-1. In this particular case, the expected benefit of information sharing is 
1.73%. 
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Figure 3.8: Structure of the optimal decision (final order) for No-IS case based in 
the beginning of stage-2. 
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Figure 3.9: Structure of the optimal cost at the beginning of stage-2 cost for No-
IS case 
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can change as a function of the parameter levels. However, the essential 
dynamics/insights from these results are expected to hold strongly in most 
settings. 
 
3.6.2 Structural properties of optimal decisions and costs 
In this section, we outline the structure of the optimal costs and optimal decision 
surfaces with or without information sharing. Following parameter set is used to 
generate the plots: c0 = 10, cu = 15, z = 0.5, k1 = 0.5, CV1 = 0.3, k2 = 0.5, CV2 = 
0.3, E(F1) = 35, σ(F1) = 15, E(F2) = 35, σ(F2) = 10, E(D) = 35, σ(D) = 10, ρ(F1, F2) 
= 0.5, ρ(F2, D) = 0.5. 
 From the above parameter set, we see that supplier respond to the soft-order 
by installing a production capacity of 50% of the size of the soft-order in stage-1. 
Also in stage-2, he installs a capacity of 50% of the size of the final-order. In both 
cases, the variability in effective production (measured in standard deviation) is 
30% of mean. If soft-order is at least as high as the final order, this scenario does 
not represent a capacity-constrained case, since on total (combining stage-1 and 
stage-2) average capacity is more than equal to the final order. We have set 
mean of point forecasts as unbiased to the final average demand. σ(F1) is set 
higher than σ(F2); it is an accepted notion that forecasts with higher lead-time 
have more variability.  
 Figure 3.6 shows the structure of the optimal soft-order Y1 w.r.t. the forecast 
F1 for both IS and No-IS case. As the figure shows the optimal soft-order for No-
IS case (Y1) is always higher than IS case (Y1s). The difference in the optimal  
 86
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
50
100
0
50
100
150
F
2
P1=1
Y
1
Y
2s
E(F
2 ) = 35
E(Y 1
s) = 45
.2
Y
2
s = F
2
P1=90
 
Figure 3.10: Structure of the optimal decision (final order) in the beginning of 
stage-2 for IS case for P1=1 and P1=100 
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Figure 3.11: Structure of the optimal cost in the beginning of stage-2 for IS case 
for P1=1 and P1=100. 
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decision increases as the forecast F1 increases. The expected difference 
between the two decisions are approximately 2 units. The important point to note 
in this figure is the difference between the optimal soft-order that minimizes the 
cost and forecast. Please note the difference between Y1=F1 and the optimal 
decision graphs Y1(F1) and Y1s(F1). It clearly shows that there is a region where 
inflating the soft-order is an optimal decision, and in another region, the reverse 
is true. Although the buyer knows that supplier installs a higher capacity with 
linearly increasing variability is she transmits a high soft-order; this way she can 
make minimize the probability of under supply. However, presence of deposit 
cost does not allow her to do so. Therefore, a tradeoff between risking the 
deposit money versus the underage cost is the reason behind why over ordering 
or unerring is optimal. It is found that if the deposit cost per unit (z) is set to zero, 
then buyer always inflate and transmits a soft-order that is maximum possible. 
This way she makes the supplier produce so much in the first stage itself that 
supplier uncertainty becomes zero. Hence, implication is that there have to be a 
penalty associated with intentionally transmitting soft-orders, which are far higher 
that demand forecasts. Unless such a penalty is present, then optimal behavior is 
to deceive. 
 Figure 3.7 presents the corresponding costs associated with the optimal 
decisions in the beginning of the stage-1. It is clear that is the IS case always 
incurs lower cost then the No-IS case. The benefit of sharing information 
increases as with higher forecast F1. From this graph, we can obtain the 
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expected total cost of IS case and No-IS case by taking expectation of g1 and g1s 
w.r.t. the distribution of F1: 
 
1 1
1
1 1 1 10
( ) ( ) ( )F FFE TC E g g F f dF
∞
== = ∫   (42) 
 
1 1
1
1 1 1 10
( ) ( ) ( )s ss F FFE TC E g g F f dF
∞
== = ∫   (43) 
The benefit of information sharing (i.e. sharing P1) is obtained by: 
 ( ) ( )%
( )
sE TC E TCBenefit
E TC
−=   (44) 
The % benefit in this particular case is 1.73%.  
 Figure 3.8 shows the structure of optimal decision in the beginning of stage-2. 
Optimal Y2 increases with increase in the demand forecast F2. We also notice 
that for a given forecast F2, optimal Y2 in No-IS case decreases with increase in 
Y1. This is obvious because, it is expected that a higher Y1 will result in a higher 
average production in stage-1, and therefore a smaller Y2 is optimal. The figure 
clearly shows the difference between the optimal final order and forecast, a 
similar observation when comparing a soft-order with a forecast. Depending on 
the state variable Y1 and F2 the optimal final order Y2 is higher or lower than the 
forecast F2. The corresponding optimal cost structure at the beginning of stage-2 
for No-IS case is shown in figure 3.9. 
 Figure 3.10 illustrate the structure of the optimal final order in the beginning of 
the stage-2 for IS case for two specific values of information being shared: P1 = 1 
and P1 = 100.  Please not that, it appears that the optimal decision does not 
depend on the soft-order anymore; however with close notice the non-linearity 
along Y1 is detectable on P1 = 1 surface. This dependence is very clear in the  
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Figure 3.12: Expected cost for buyer under No-IS case decreases with 
increase in capacity of second stage. Cost is lower if capacity variability 
(CV1) is lower. 
Figure 3.13: Expected cost for buyer under IS case decreases with 
increase in capacity of second stage. Cost is lower if capacity variability 
(CV1) is lower. 
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corresponding optimal cost surface plotted in figure 3.11. As evident from figure 
3.10, depending on value of P1 being shared, the difference in optimal decisions 
can be as higher than 50%. 
 
3.6.3 Numerical assessment of the benefits of information sharing 
This section investigates effect of various factors on benefits of information 
sharing. In particular, we consider the impact of per unit deposit cost along with 
underage and overage cost and impact of supply uncertainty. 
 
3.6.3.1 The impact of k1, k2 and CV on expected percentage benefit 
Considering CV1 = CV2 the parameter set used for this section of analysis is as 
follows: c0 = 10, cu = 15, z = 0.5, CV1 = CV2, E(F1) = 35, σ(F1) = 15, E(F2) = 35, 
σ(F2) = 10, E(D) = 35, σ(D) = 10, ρ(F1, F2) = 0.5, ρ(F2, D) = 0.5. 
 Increase in k1 and k2 represent suppliers expected capacity commitment in 
stage-1 and stage-2 respectively. Increase in CV1 represents the increase in 
variability of the production system. From figure 3.12 and 3.13 we notice that 
increase in capacity commitment in stage-2 by supplier decreases the expected 
cost in both no IS case as well as IS case. This is obvious because if capacity in 
second stage is increase, then dependence on  first stage production for a better 
fill rate decreases. In fact, if second stage capacity is high enough to produce the 
final order size in an expected sense, then soft-order transmission is of no value 
as well supplier need not have to produce anything in first stage. The effect of 
variability that is introduced through the CV1 factors is as expected, lower CV1 is  
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Figure 3.14: Expected percentage cost benefit for buyer is 
maximum for a particular second stage expected capacity set by
the supplier. Benefit is negligible if expected capacity set by
customer is zero irrespective of order size or when expected
capacity set is same as the order size. Benefit is high when 
variability (CV1) is high. 
Figure 3.15: Expected percentage cost benefit for buyer increases
with decrease in expected capacity commitment in first stage by 
supplier. 
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results in reduced cost. Although without plotting the % Benefit graph we may not 
comment on the cost difference between IS and No-IS case, we see a steeper 
decrease in E(TC) compared to E(TCs). This effect is very pronounced when CV1 
is relatively higher (see 0.4 and 0.2) in both IS and No-IS case. This implies that 
marginal expected cost reduction for buyer through increasing capacity 
commitment in stage-2 by supplier has better effect when information is shared 
and when variation is high. 
 The % benefit graph for same k1=1 is plotted in figure 3.14. As explained 
above the cost benefit for the buyer is high is CV1 is high. There exist no benefit 
when CV1 is very small (e.g. 0.001). The benefit is highest at a particular value of 
k2. This is due to the way rate of decrease of E(TC) and E(TCs) w.r.t. k2. The 
inference from these graphs is that sharing of P1 has little value if supplier’s 
commitment to second stage capacity is either very small or very high when 
compared to the final order. 
 Figure 3.14 and 3.15 together illustrates the difference in % Benefit for 
different capacity commitment by supplier in stage-1. A smaller capacity 
commitment in stage-1 (k1=0.4) is more capacity constrained compared to k1=1. 
We saw that for same level of variability (CV1’s) the benefit of information sharing 
is higher when capacity in first stage is constrained. When variability is extremely 
small (CV1=0.001), irrespective of the capacity commitment, the benefit is close 
to zero. 
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Figure 3.16: Expected percentage cost benefit for buyer for different c0 
and cu when unit deposit cost is z=0. Benefit increases with increase in cu, 
however decrease with increase in c0. 
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Figure 3.17: Expected percentage cost benefit for buyer for different c0
and cu when unit deposit cost is z=7. Comparing figure 3.16 and 3.17 we 
notice that benefit has increased when z is a positive value. 
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3.6.3.2 The impact of unit deposit cost z on expected percentage benefit 
Considering CV1 = CV2 the parameter set used for this section of analysis is as 
follows: k1=0.5, k2=0.5, CV1 = CV2=0.3, E(F1) = 35, σ(F1) = 15, E(F2) = 35, σ(F2) = 
10, E(D) = 35, σ(D) = 10, ρ(F1, F2) = 0.5, ρ(F2, D) = 0.5. 
 The impact of z on expected % Benefit is illustrated in figure 3.16, 3.17, 3.18 
and 3.19. Impact of z is illustrated here in comparison with per unit overage cost 
c0 and per unit underage cost cu. The effect of z on % Benefit is as seen in figure 
3.18 and 3.19. We notice that for the same combination of overage and 
underage cost, a higher z=7 value results in higher % Benefit compared to z=0. 
Here, z=0 case corresponds to case when no deposit needed for submitting a 
soft-order. On the hand, a very high unit deposit cost for a unit of soft-order will 
make the buyer consider her soft-orders like a firm order. Had our cost model 
contain a purchase price, the value of z for which a soft-order becomes a firm 
one is when z become equal to purchase price. The transition of a pure soft-
order (i.e. z=0) to a more firm one is shown in figure 3.18. From figure 3.18, there 
exist a unique value of z for a given cu and c0 when the % Benefit is maximal. 
This optimal vale is pronounced in c0=2 compared to c0=10. % Benefit becomes 
stable after certain value of z for a given combination of cu and c0. This imply that 
a very high deposit (z=5, 7) cost will increase the cost of soft-ordering without 
necessarily increasing the value of upstream information sharing. 
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3.6.3.3 The impact of c0 and cu on expected percentage benefit 
Considering CV1 = CV2 the parameter set used for this section of analysis is as 
follows: k1=0.5, k2=0.5, CV1 = CV2=0.3, E(F1) = 35, σ(F1) = 15, E(F2) = 35, σ(F2) = 
10, E(D) = 35, σ(D) = 10, ρ(F1, F2) = 0.5, ρ(F2, D) = 0.5.  
While it is obvious that increasing the value of c0 or cu will increase the 
expected cost for buyer under both upstream information sharing versus no 
sharing scenario, their effect on % Benefit however can not be guessed so 
straightforward. The effect of increasing c0 is just the opposite of the effect of 
increasing cu in terms of  % Benefit of sharing upstream information. The trend 
sin figure 3.16, 3.17, 3.18 and 3.19 clearly show that increasing c0 decreases 
the % Benefit while increasing cu increases the % Benefit. One possible reason 
for such behavior is that the upstream information in this case effectively reduces 
the supply uncertainty in the beginning of stage-2 and hence reduces the 
possibility of underage. This is more pronounces when capacity is constrained 
and to get a better fill rate stage-2 production is necessary. We have chosen 
k1=k2=0.5 with z=0.5. This setting imply that capacity is more than necessary if 
soft-order is more than final order, but this will be restricted by deposit cost. 
Therefore, if she places a soft-order nearly same as the final order, average 
capacity that the supplier commits is barely enough to produce the full final order. 
On the other hand, the supplier does not supply more than what has been 
ordered. In this model, the information about how much has been produced by 
the end of stage-1 is needed only to prepare if case supplier has not produced 
enough. If he has produced more than enough then knowing P1 has no value. 
 96
  
Figure 3.18: Effect of increase in z on expected percentage cost 
benefit is nonlinear; in cases like cu = 9 above, the benefit increases 
abruptly initially and decrease slightly and flattens. 
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Figure 3.19:  For a similar rate of change of cu and z, a bigger value of 
c0 reduces the benefits, while increase in cu increase benefit. 
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The figure 3.19 shows it clearly sharing P1 is beneficial if cu is high. Now 
increasing c0 makes the buyer to order less, effectively making her less 
concerted about underage, in other words effective cu goes down if c0 goes high. 
Therefore, increase in c0 decreases the benefit.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
We have presented a model to decide optimally on soft-order revisions in the 
presence of supply uncertainty and atypical demand. Our analysis reveals that 
the optimal soft-order and final frim-order are not necessarily the same as the 
demand forecast made during the time of issuing the order. While in some 
instances inflating a (soft) order compared to the demand forecast is optimal, 
deflating the orders is optimal in certain other cases. We have studied the impact 
of sharing upstream information such as the inventory position of supplier while 
revising the soft-order. A mathematical inequality is derived that states that 
vendor's expected cost would never deteriorate when this extra piece of 
information is received. Detailed numerical analysis reveals that expected cost 
benefit is significant, in some cases reaching 11%, when supply side variability is 
high and supplier's commitment to capacity is constrained compared to order 
size. Our model has also introduced a novel deposit scheme that forces the 
buyer not to issue unrealistically high soft-orders. This study reveals that 
increasing the deposit for a unit soft-order increases the benefit of information 
sharing. Another observation is that while increasing underage cost increases the 
benefit of information sharing, w.r.t. the overage cost, the effect is opposite. 
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 The study has opened up several possibilities for future research. Firstly, the 
current supplier model is simplistic; the supply uncertainty model is exogenous in 
our case. Future study should conjoin this model with an optimal supplier model 
such as one proposed in Baruah and Chinnam (2006). Second, we have not 
studied the benefit for the supplier while he shares his inventory information. We 
hope that this question can be answered through an integrated model. Third, the 
proposed deposit scheme needs more research in terms of determining 
appropriate deposit per unit of soft-order. More investigation is also due in terms 
of how to model a deposit scheme if an initial soft-order is revised more than 
once before submitting the final order. Finally, in reality, modeling the uncertain 
demand and supply environments needs relevant data that is difficult to obtain. A 
few practical questions can be posed, if there exists no history to model 
distributions, while uncertainties do exist, how to go about making decisions? 
This last point in our view is most important if model needs to be implemented in 
the real world, and therefore, most challenging. 
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CHAPTER IV  
Conclusion and Future Research 
4.1 Conclusion 
This research has studied supply chain operational planning in atypical demand 
situations and the impact of information sharing. The study uses a two-player 
supply chain configuration comprising a buyer and a supplier. The buyer faces 
atypical demand and supply uncertainty. The supplier faces effective capacity 
uncertainty and buyer’s soft-order(s) and final order as his demand. A stochastic 
dynamic programming buyer model for optimal soft-order generation and revision 
is presented that accounts soft-order deposit costs. A stochastic dynamic 
programming supplier model for optimal production releases is also offered that 
accounts soft-order revisions and effective capacity uncertainty. Based on these 
two models, the effects of sharing soft-orders between the players as well as 
supplier’s order inventory position on both parties involved are studied. 
The supplier model shows that soft-order sharing is beneficial to supplier 
as well as the buyer. Structural relationship between several different factors that 
affect the benefit of information sharing is explored. We found that that benefit of 
downstream information sharing varies as a function of order lead times, soft-
order volatility, and reliability of soft-orders. The benefit of receiving soft-orders 
depends primarily on the degree of capacity severity and uncertainty. Volatility in 
soft-orders is detrimental to both the players, resulting in increased order 
fulfillment costs while lowering order fill-rates. Although receiving early soft-
orders improves the supplier’s ability to complete the order, soft-orders are 
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inherently uncertain, increasing the risk of over production. An optimal lead-time 
for sharing soft-orders can be determined based on the levels of effective 
capacity, demand forecast uncertainty, and the different cost parameters. We 
also demonstrate that stochastic dynamic programming technique cannot fully 
account for intentional soft-order inflation by the buyer, even under conditions of 
a stable and linear order inflation pattern. The analysis reveals that the buyer has 
an incentive to inflate soft-orders at a cost to the manufacturer, in the absence of 
an early soft-order deposit. 
Not unlike the classic newsvendor model, our buyer’s model clearly shows 
the difference between optimal soft-order(s) and mean demand forecasts. In the 
newsvendor model, the order fractile is a function of unit overage and underage 
costs, and the order matches the mean expected demand only if these costs are 
the same. However, the mechanics are more complicated with our buyer’s model. 
While inflating the soft-order with respect to the average demand forecast is 
optimal in some cases, deflating it is optimal in some other cases. Both inflation 
and deflation can be optimal under given overage and underage costs, with the 
optimal action depending on the demand forecast besides others. As for the 
impact of sharing supplier’s order inventory position with the buyer before 
receiving the final firm order, a mathematical inequality is derived that states the 
following: buyer’s expected total cost would never deteriorate when this extra 
piece of information is received. Detailed numerical analyses reveal that 
expected cost benefit from receiving order inventory position is significant, in 
some cases reaching 11%, when supply side variability is high and supplier's 
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capacity is constrained. Our model has also introduced a novel deposit scheme 
that forces the buyer not to issue unrealistically high soft orders. This study 
reveals that to some degree, increasing the deposit for a unit soft-order increases 
the benefit of information sharing. Another observation is that while increasing 
underage cost increases the benefit of upstream information sharing, with 
respect to the overage cost, the effect is opposite; increasing overage cost 
decreases the benefit of sharing upstream information. 
  
4.2 Research contributions 
This research has taken a holistic view to explore the effect of atypical demand 
on both retailers as well as suppliers (facing effective capacity uncertainty). Effect 
of information flow (soft-order(s) and supplier’s order inventory position), effect of 
product flow decisions (release decisions under holding cost), and effect of flow 
of funds (early deposit with soft-order) has been studied in a single product 
setting. More specifically, this research explores the questions asked in section 
1.7 in a supply chain setting that is described in section 1.5. We hope that these 
insights can help supply chain decision makers exploit opportunities that 
frequently arise in atypical demand environments. 
 
4.2.1 Contributions from supplier model 
Specific contribution of this research due to the supplier model based on 
stochastic dynamic programming: 
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(i) This is the first study to explore the benefits of sharing soft-order(s) with the 
supplier. The study shows that both the supplier as well as the retailer 
benefits by sharing soft-orders. 
(ii) The study also investigates the effect of soft-order accuracy, volatility (e.g., 
due to lead-times), and intentional inflation on benefits to both parties 
involved. 
(iii) Sensitivity analysis reveals several structural properties of the cost-benefit 
trade-off of information sharing versus no sharing with managerial insights. 
(iv) A production-scheduling algorithm with forecast revision and capacity 
uncertainty is formulated for the study. Related model from the previous 
research (such as Housman and Peterson 1972, Raman and Kim 2002) 
accounted for capacity constraint, however, did not account for capacity 
uncertainty. This is critical for random production yield (which we term 
effective capacity uncertainty) is typical in the real word (Yano and Lee 
1995). The study shows that the effect of effective capacity uncertainty is 
significant in influencing costs for both parties. 
(v) The production-scheduling model for supplier measures the holding cost 
more accurately than that reported in Raman and Kim (2002). Raman and 
Kim (2002) do not account for holding cost for the stage in which the product 
is produced. We estimate holding cost for the stage of production as well.  
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4.2.2 Contributions from buyer model 
The contribution of this research due to the buyer model based on stochastic 
dynamic programming: 
(i) This is the first time an optimal soft-order revision model for retailer facing 
atypical demand and supply uncertainty is presented. Fisher et al’s (2001) 
model on optimal inventory replenishment of retail fashion products is closet 
to ours, but does not optimize soft-orders; their model optimizes two firm 
orders sent in different time-periods.  
(ii) Our model prescribes optimal soft-order revision both with and without 
upstream supplier’s inventory position information. 
(iii) We have modeled production uncertainty that degenerate into supply 
uncertainty. This allows us to relate effect of capacity commitment on 
different production stages by supplier on buyer’s replenishment decisions. 
While demand uncertainty has gained lot of attention, no literature has 
previously studied production inventory system that accounts for supply 
uncertainty simultaneously accounting for atypical demand. 
(iv) We have shown that upstream information sharing improves retailer’s 
optimal soft-order revision policy in term of expected cost. 
(v) This research has shown for the first time that while soft-order inflation is 
optimal under certain circumstances, deflation may also be optimal. 
(vi) We have devised a fair deposit scheme that is incurred to buyer while soft-
ordering. This novel scheme prevents unrealistic or fake soft-orders. 
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(vii) Detail numerical analysis is presented that explore structural properties of 
optimality and managerial insights are presented. 
 
4.3 Future research 
Author believes that more research is due to study problems on supply chain 
management facing atypical demand scenarios and uncertain supply. 
Development of better and practical forecasting-production-inventory-capacity 
policies is due. Here, we briefly discuss a few possible areas of future research 
that can possibly fill the gap in the present research: 
(i) Cost of information sharing: None of our models presented here have 
accounted for cost of information sharing. Information sharing between two 
companied are possible only if there is necessary infrastructure in place. In 
addition, colleting the information also incurs costs. In context of this 
research, supplier can transmit soft-order in timely manner only if a system 
is in place to collect it, transmit it, and be received by supplier. Similarly, 
order inventory position sharing needs a system to accurately count 
inventory and data transmission capability. Unless benefits of information 
sharing outweigh cost of installing these systems, information sharing is not 
a value proposition. 
(ii) Deposit scheme: The proposed deposit scheme need more research in 
terms of how to find out what an appropriate deposit per unit of soft-order. 
More research is due to optimally devise such a deposit for a scenario 
presented here. More investigation is due in terms of how to model a deposit 
 106
scheme if an initial soft-order is revised more than once before submitting 
the final order. 
(iii) Inaccurate information sharing: While the supplier’s model in our research 
study the effect of intentional soft order inflation, the retailer’s model has 
assumed that order inventory position shared by the supplier is a true signal. 
More investigation is necessary to analyze the impact of supplier’ sharing a 
wrong order inventory position. 
(iv) Incentive for sharing order inventory: Present retailer model does not shed 
light on ‘why supplier should share order information with his retailer?’ While 
benefit of soft-order information sharing is clear to both parties, supplier as 
well retailer, the benefit of sharing order inventory for supplier needs more 
investigation. 
(v) Conjoined supplier-retailer model: The present supplier’s model considers 
soft-orders evolution process as exogenously given for the supplier. On the 
retailer’s side, the supplier model is very simplistic; the supply uncertainty 
model is exogenous in our case. Future study should conjoin these two 
models to gain more insight related to benefit of information sharing in terms 
a centralized versus decentralized way of planning a two-player supply chain. 
(vi) Multi-product setting: The future study should incorporate a multi product 
setting and explore the computational complexity of a manufacturing 
scheduling algorithm and retailer’s soft order revision policy. In multi product 
setting, brute search to find the optimal release or the optimal soft-order may 
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be extremely time consuming; more research on heuristics to solve such 
problem is necessary.  
(vii) Supply chain cost or profit: A more detailed analysis is needed to find out the 
benefit of information sharing in terms of supply chain profit.  
(viii) Modeling uncertainty in absence of historical data: Modeling the uncertain 
demand and supply environments need relevant data that is difficult to 
obtain. A practical question is if there exists no history to model distributions, 
while uncertainties do exist, how to go about making decisions. This point in 
our view is most important if model needs to be implemented in real world 
and therefore most challenging. 
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ABSTRACT 
SUPPLY CHAINS FACING ATYPICAL DEMAND: OPTIMAL OPERATIONAL 
POLICIES AND BENEFITS UNDER INFORMATION SHARING 
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Demand patterns for products with seasonality and or short life-cycles do not follow 
a clear discernible pattern (to allow predictive time-series modeling of demand) for 
individual sales events or seasons due to such factors as considerable demand 
volatility, product promotions, and unforeseen marketplace events. Suppliers 
supporting such atypical demand patterns typically incur higher holding costs, lower 
capacity utilization, and lower order fill-rates, particularly under long lead-times and 
uncertainty in effective capacity. Retailers on the other hand struggle with product 
overages and supply shortages. On the other hand, atypical demand settings bring 
huge financial opportunity to supply chain players, and are pervasive. It is suggested 
in the literature that an effective means to reap these benefits is through increased 
information sharing between retailers and suppliers, superior forecasting with 
forecast update techniques, proper replenishment, and custom designed 
inventory/manufacturing policies. We also believe that sharing of order forecasts, 
also known as soft-orders, in advance by the buyer could be beneficial to both 
parties involved.   
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This dissertation in particular studies a two-player supply chain, facing 
atypical demand. Among the two-players is a buyer (retailer/distributor/vendor) that 
makes ordering decision(s) in the presence of upstream supply uncertainty and 
demand forecast revision(s). We propose a stochastic dynamic programming model 
to optimally deicide on soft-order(s) and a final firm-order under a deposit scheme 
for initial soft-order(s). While sharing of upstream soft-order inventory position 
information by the supplier before receiving a final order is not a common industrial 
practice, nor is it discussed in the literature, our analysis shows that such information 
sharing is beneficial under certain conditions.  
Second player of the supply chain is a supplier (manufacturer) that makes 
production release decision(s) in the presence of limited and random effective 
capacity, and final order uncertainty. Our stochastic dynamic programming model for 
optimal production release decision making reveals that substantial savings in order-
fulfillment cost (that includes holding, overage, and underage costs) can be realized 
in the presence of advance soft-order(s). Soft-orders can also be shown to improve 
order fill-rate for the buyer.  
This research explores complex interactions of factors that affect the 
operational decision making process, such as costs, demand uncertainty, supply 
uncertainty, effective capacity severity, information accuracy, information volatility, 
intentional manipulation of information etc. Through extensive analysis of the 
operational policies, we provide managerial insights, many of which are intuitively 
appealing, such as, additional information never increases cost of an optimal 
decision; many are also counterintuitive, for example, dynamic programming models 
cannot fully compensate for intentional soft-order inflation by the buyer, even under 
conditions of a stable and linear order inflation pattern, in the absence of deposits. 
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